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Users share their sensitive personal data with each other through public ser-
vices and applications provided by third parties. Users trust application providers
with their private data since they want access to provided services. However, trust-
ing third parties with private data can be risky: providers profit by sharing that
data with others regardless of the user’s desires and may fail to provide the se-
curity necessary to prevent data leaks. Though users may choose between service
providers, in many cases no service providers provide the desired service without
being granted access to user data. Users must make a choice: forego privacy or be
denied service.
I demonstrate that fine-grained user privacy policies and rich services and
applications are not irreconcilable. I provide technical solutions to privacy problems
that protect user data using cryptography while still allowing services to operate on
that data. I do this primarily through content-agnostic references to data items and
user-controlled pseudonymity. I support two classes of social networking applications
without trusting third parties with private data: applications which do not require
data contents to provide a service, and applications that deal with data where the
only private information is the binding of the data to an identity. Together, these
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The rise of online social networks (OSNs) and mobile devices in recent years
has triggered a new era of applications that allow users to easily share information
on the public Internet. These applications provide novel services that, judging by
their popularity [100], are highly desired. In OSNs such as Facebook, Twitter, and
Google+, users use these applications to share personal data such as gender, religion,
and photos with friends. However, they also reveal that data to the service providers,
sometimes deliberately and willingly, sometimes accidentally or unknowingly [106].
Mobile devices have compounded the problem, by providing fine-grained location
information [110] and other mobile information [109] automatically to these appli-
cations – highly private information that concerns users who are not always sure
how to protect themselves from its exposure.
Even if the user trusts a provider with her personal data, she must also trust
that they will be able to protect it; several unintentional data leaks from otherwise
trustworthy providers [115, 116] have been publicly revealed in recent years. Unlike
in the case of leakage of, say, credit card information that leads directly to observable
fraud, it is difficult to anticipate or detect the direct and indirect means by which a
malicious entity might profit from personally identifiable information leaked in this
way. Research has illuminated the consequences of some of these leaks [46, 56], sug-
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gesting that it is a significant problem that sometimes may even take years to arise
after the data is initially exposed. The true scope of this problem is immeasureable:
not only can we not fully assess the damage from the leaks that are known, but we
also cannot know if providers have had security breaches that they have not revealed
to the public.
Nevertheless, users continue to trust providers with their private data because
they want to use the applications that those third parties provide. Due to the nature
of these services and their popularity, users are under social pressure to provide their
data to these providers [35]. Unfortunately, it is the providers and not the users who
get to decide what the rules are for sharing private data: if the user wants to use the
provider’s services, she must agree to their terms [105, 108] about her private data.
Providers have little incentive other than potentially embarrassing public relations
gaffes to protect user data, but they have plenty of economic incentive to share
that data with advertisers or third party applications. Thus, current online social
networks retain excessive control over user data and users must make a difficult
choice between agreeing to the providers’ terms or abandoning the service.
I argue the following thesis: it is possible to provide technical mechanisms
to share private data over public networks, mechanisms that support desired user
privacy policies while maintaining a wide range of application functionality.
I envision systems in which users retain control over the disclosure of their
data, deciding precisely which other entities should be able to access which data
items. There are many challenges to providing the rich application functionality
to which users are accustomed while respecting the privacy policies that users may
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choose. Though the challenges run the gamut from usability, to economic viability,
to deployment, I focus primarily on providing solutions to the technical challenges
associated with applications that handle private data. That is, I provide crypto-
graphic and system-level tools that enable users to explicitly control to whom their
private data is exposed. By providing this control locally, the user does not need to
trust her service providers with unfettered access to her data, nor does she need to
rely on her service providers to prevent data breaches.
To support my thesis, I first require an underlying framework for user-defined
privacy that is compatible with how users wish to disclose data in OSNs. OSN
communication takes many forms, including: one-to-one communication in the form
of private messages, one-to-many communication in the form of user-specified groups
such as “friends”, and one-to-many communication to (perhaps unknown) recipients
who are identified by others as in the case of friend-of-friend communication. I
describe a secure OSN communication substrate as a foundation for building the
case for my thesis. This supporting work is described primarily in Chapter 2 with
some additional support in Chapter 3.
Based on my OSN communication framework, I consider the varied nature
of OSN applications and identify large, generic classes of applications that I can
reason about abstractly. I identify a class of applications that are content-agnostic,
that is, applications that do not require access to data contents in order to provide
service. I discuss these applications in Chapter 2, especially with regards to content-
agnostic core OSN applications. The second class of applications that I identify
are those which operate on semi-private data, i.e., data whose contents are not
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inherently private, but the linkability of that data to an identity is considered private
information. I describe many examples of these applications and provide a general
framework for providing privacy in these applications in Chapter 4. The remaining
class of applications fall outside of these two classes; such applications require access
both to data contents and to the mapping from data contents to identities.
Finally, I must identify how these classes of application services can be pro-
vided while respecting the users’ privacy policies. I describe how to do so for any
content-agnostic application in Chapter 2. I consider many example applications of
semi-private applications and possible user privacy policies that can be provided in
Chapter 4, though in practice every application in this category requires application-
specific analysis to determine which privacy policies can be provided. For the re-
maining class of leftover applications, I do not provide better solutions than that of
trusting the third party. Further dividing this final class of applications to provide
privacy in other ways is described in Chapter 6 as a topic of future work.
This dissertation is structured as follows. Chapter 2 describes Persona [6],
a distributed and decentralized OSN in which users choose with which provider
to store their data and protect their data content via encryption. Persona uses
attribute-based encryption (ABE) to intuitively share data with groups of friends
and even friends of friends. I describe how key OSN applications are implemented
in Persona despite the encryption of data contents.
Chapter 3 describes Bond Breaker [7]. Bond Breaker is a demonstration that
users can thwart OSN impersonation – a significant threat to the key distribution
problem in decentralized OSNs – using exclusive shared knowledge. It also demon-
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strates that users can collaboratively create a decentralized OSN PKI in-band, a
valuable component for OSNs where users may not be willing to go out of their way
for security.
In Chapter 4 I describe Twain, a pseudonymous rendezvous abstraction that
can be used as a building block for privacy-enabled systems. Twain allows two users
to rendezvous subject to the constraints of both users, so that users only reveal their
true identities to each other if they are satisfied that the other user can be trusted.
Twain provides a framework to implement user privacy policies for applications that
require some amount of matching on private data contents.
Finally, in Chapter 6 I discuss the implications of this work. I describe open
problems in this space, both in terms of technical challenges that are immediately
relevant to this work and in terms of non-technical challenges that nevertheless
impede the deployability of a new, privacy-enabled infrastructure. I conclude with
an argument that my work describes the right approach to solving the complex





OSNs have become a de facto portal for Internet access for millions of users.
These networks help users share information with their friends. Along the way,
however, users entrust the social network provider with such personal information
as sexual preferences, political and religious views, phone numbers, occupations,
identities of friends, and photographs. Although sites offer privacy controls that
let users restrict how their data is viewed by other users, sites provide insufficient
controls to restrict data sharing with corporate affiliates or application developers.
Not only are there few controls to limit information disclosure, acceptable use
policies require both that users provide accurate information and that users grant
the provider the right to sell that information to others. Facebook is a representative
example of a social network provider.
Cryptography is the natural tool for protecting privacy in a distributed setting,
but obvious cryptographic schemes do not allow users to scalably define their privacy
settings in OSNs. Users want to be able to share content with entire groups, such
as their friends, their family, or their classmates. Public key cryptography alone
is unsatisfactory when managing groups in an OSN: either users must store many
copies of encrypted data, users are unable to give data based on membership in
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multiple groups, or users must know the identities of everyone to whom they give
access.
To meet the privacy needs of an OSN, we1 present Persona, an OSN that
puts policy decisions in the hands of the users. Persona uses decentralized, per-
sistent storage so that user data remains available in the system and so that users
may choose with whom they store their information. We build Persona using crypto-
graphic primitives that include attribute-based encryption (ABE), traditional public
key cryptography (PKC), and automated key management mechanisms to translate
between the two cryptosystems.
Persona achieves privacy by encrypting private content and prevents misuse of
a user’s applications through authentication. Persona allows users to store private
data persistently with intermediaries, but does not require that users trust those
intermediaries to keep private data secret. Modern web browsers can support the
cryptographic operations needed to automatically encrypt and decrypt private data
in Persona with plugins that intercept web pages to replace encrypted contents.
Lastly, Persona divides the OSN entities into two categories: users, who generate the
content in the OSN, and applications, which provide services to users and manipulate
the OSN content.
This chapter is organized as follows. We describe the cryptographic primitives
and how they comprise the correct cryptographic systems for Persona in Section 2.2.
We present novel compositions of ABE and PKC functions that allow users to create
1This work [6] involved the collaboration of Adam Bender, Bobby Bhattacharjee, Neil Spring,
and Daniel Starin.
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flexible and dynamic access policies in Section 2.3. We describe the role of OSN
applications in Persona and show that Persona supports existing OSN applications
in Section 2.4. We present significant features of our implementation in Section 2.5.
We evaluate the performance of Persona using data from a Facebook crawl and ABE
microbenchmarks on a mobile device in Section 2.6. We discuss additional problems
beyond the scope of this work in Section 2.7, and conclude with some retrospection
about how OSNs have changed between when we conducted this research and the
present day in Section 2.8.
2.2 Cryptography in a Private OSN
There are two tasks for encryption in building the private online social net-
work. The first is to restrict the information available to applications as precisely
as possible, so that individual organizations are not entrusted with large volumes
of personal information. Although it is tempting to focus only on the exchange of
information with friends, some applications may benefit from limited access to a
user’s profile, location, or messages, while carefully avoiding broad exposure.
The second task is to restrict the information shared with “friends” to what
might be appropriate. We quote “friends” here because the type of social link might
be more than, less than, or different from “friend.” Family, neighbor, co-worker, boss,
teammate, and other relations might define a connection in the social network. That
connection is often simply termed “friend”, regardless of the actual, off-line relation-
ship. A user’s decision to accept one of these pseudo-friends into their neighborhood
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(and avoid discussing certain topics) or exclude them (and avoid the benefits of so-
cial networking) represents a dilemma that can be avoided, if users may flexibly
classify their “friends.”
Alone, these two problems may be easily solved. A social network could help
users define access policies that include or exclude defined groups of friends accessing
different pieces of information. Such a feature would allow a user to tweet “called
in sick to work” without telling co-workers. In practice, users segregate work col-
leagues from personal friends by subscribing to different social networks. To provide
such functionality efficiently without the assistance of a trusted application provider
requires some form of cryptographic support for group keying. In this section, we
define two methods to share information with groups in an OSN.
What makes the OSN setting different from typical group keying scenarios is
that the sender (to the group) may not be in charge of group membership. For
example, Alice may post a message on Bob’s wall, encrypted for Bob’s friends,
without (necessarily) knowing the list of Bob’s friends. Further, Alice might wish
to send a message to Bob’s friends who live in the neighborhood: “Let’s meet up
tonight”. Another aspect of the OSN setting is that the number of potential groups
a user might encrypt to is very large (any possible combination of friends of their
friends). Cryptographic support alone is not sufficient for building a distributed




With the abstract goals of hiding personal information from aggregators and
hiding personal information from colleagues, we next refine these goals down to
concrete requirements for cryptographic methods.
Each Persona user generates an asymmetric key-pair and distributes the public
key out-of-band to other users with whom she wants to share data. We refer to these
other users as friends, though the nature of each relationship is defined by the user.
Persona allows users to create “groups” and choose which users are part of
a given group. Users control access to personal data by encrypting to “groups.”
Restricting data to specific groups allows users to have fine-grained control over
access policy, which permits exchanging data with more restrictions.
Cryptographic primitives in Persona must allow users to flexibly specify and
encrypt to groups. Users may specify groups using arbitrary criteria, but we expect
users to choose groups based on transparent relationships such as “neighbor” or “co-
worker” or on attributes such as “football fan” or “knitting buddy.” Groups created
by one user do not affect the groups that can be created by another. However, to
support OSN communication patterns, the groups created by one user should be
available for use, not just for decryption, but also for encryption, by friends.
2.2.2 Traditional public-key approach
Traditional public-key and symmetric cryptography can be combined to form
an efficient group encryption primitive [62, 92]. To create a new group from a list
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of known friends, Alice encrypts a newly-generated group key with the public key
of each member of the new group. She then distributes this key to the members
of that group and uses the key to encrypt messages to the group. The group key
may be symmetric, in which case only group members can encrypt to the group, or
asymmetric, which allows non-members to encrypt as well.
Distributing a new group key may coincide with sending a new message: to
create a message for all of her friends, Alice might include both the keys and the
data in the same object for efficiency. To efficiently reuse a group and key for many
messages could require separating the keys from the data and caching the group key
for use on later messages. We informally term the re-use of keys to avoid wasteful
repetition of public key operations “recycling.”
This protocol is computationally inexpensive, in that it does not require sig-
natures; the worst an attacker could do is provide a faulty key that would soon be
discovered. It is also flexible for the group creator, in that the original creator can
enumerate any set of friends to include in the group. It is somewhat flexible for
others, in that a friend who is a member of two groups (“neighbor” and “football
fan”) may encrypt a message for the union of these groups (“neighbor OR football
fan”) by encrypting the message with both group keys separately. However, a friend
cannot further restrict access to an intersection (“neighbor AND football fan”) with-
out exposing the message to colluding friends that do not match the expression (one
a neighbor, the other a football fan). One could encrypt with one group key and
then the other, but the colluding members of each set could decrypt the message
intended for only the members with both attributes.
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Allowing users to encrypt data for groups that they are not members of requires
additional infrastructure. Alice can give her friends the ability to encrypt messages
for any of her groups defined by an asymmetric keypair by publishing a list of her
groups and their public keys. Other users consult this list to send messages to Alice’s
groups. However, only group members can encrypt to groups defined by a shared
symmetric key.
2.2.3 ABE
Alternately, attribute-based encryption (ABE) [9] can be used to implement
encryption to groups. To use ABE, each user generates an ABE public key (APK)
and an ABE master secret key (AMSK). For each friend, the user can then generate
an ABE secret key (ASK) corresponding to the set of attributes that defines the
groups that friend should be part of. For instance, if Alice decides that Bob is a
“neighbor”, “co-worker”, and “football fan”, then she would generate and distribute to
Bob an ABE attribute secret key that includes those three attributes. Bob becomes
a member of the groups defined by combinations of those attributes.
In ABE, each encryption must specify an access structure: a logical expression
over attributes. For instance, Alice can choose to encrypt a message with access
structure (‘neighbor’ OR ‘football fan’), where ‘neighbor’ and ‘football fan’ are
attributes, rather than groups, and any of her friends who have an attribute secret
key with either attribute will be able to decrypt the message. Alice can also encrypt
to (‘neighbor’ AND ‘football fan’). In this case, the ABE construction ensures that
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only friends with both attributes will be able to decrypt the message. Unlike in
the traditional cryptography approach, a single encryption operation constructs the
new group and provides the (symmetric) key that protects the rest of the message.
Furthermore, any user who knows Alice’s ABE public key can encrypt to any access
structure (and thus create any group) by knowing the names and definitions of the
attributes Alice defined.
ABE provides a natural mapping for the group encryption primitive that we
envision for OSNs. This simplicity comes at a performance penalty: ABE opera-
tions are about 100-1000 times slower than those of RSA. These ABE operations
can be avoided in practice by careful system design. Specifically, ABE defines new
groups through attributes and permits sharing efficient, symmetric keys that can
be “recycled” to avoid expensive operations. This approach means that ABE’s per-
formance penalty need only be paid when it provides its ease-of-use or third-party
group-definition advantages, not for each operation.
Consider our example access structure (‘neighbor’ AND ‘football fan’). In
creating this group, Alice had to enumerate all her friends and distribute a new
group key to matching friends. Now imagine that Bob wants to encrypt data to
the same (‘neighbor’ AND ‘football fan’) group. With ABE, Bob would encrypt
using (‘neighbor’ AND ‘football fan’) as the access structure. Under traditional
cryptography, if Alice had pre-defined this group (and invited Bob), then Bob could
encrypt using the group symmetric key. Otherwise, Bob can encrypt this message
only if he can enumerate all of Alice’s friends and know whether they belonged to
both groups.
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Using ABE allows friend-of-friend interactions without requiring enumerations
of friend and attribute lists. A friend may limit who may read a response to a wall
post to a more restricted group. For example, if Alice writes “I want to watch Seren-
ity this weekend,” as a post to her ‘friends’, Bob might reply “I have the DVD, let’s
watch it at my place,” to Alice’s ‘friends’ who also have the ‘in-the-neighborhood’
attribute. Without ABE, Bob would have to rely on Alice to have created this
(intersection) group in advance. As long as users share attribute names (and their
meanings) with friends, ABE provides an elegant mechanism for users to target in-
formation for friends-of-friends. The same functionality can be implemented without
ABE, but requires more information exchange (lists of all friends-of-friends and their
attributes) and a key distribution mechanism (that maps groups defined by friends
to the group key).
2.3 Group Key Management
We describe how Persona users define groups and how users generate and use
keys corresponding to groups. Keys guard access to two types of objects in Persona:
user data and abstract resources. In Persona, all users store their data encrypted for
groups that they define. Any user that can name a piece of data may retrieve it, but
they can only read it if they belong to the group for which the data was encrypted.
Abstract resources represent non-data objects, for example, a user’s storage space or
a Facebook Wall. The set of possible operations on an abstract resource is tailored
to the resource (for example, it is possible to write onto a storage space or post to a
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user’s Wall). Each resource has a home which maintains and enforces the resource’s
Access Control List (ACL). The resource’s owner may change the resource ACL
and allow specific groups different levels of access to the resource. The Persona
group management operations described in this section allow users to control access
to data and resources. All Persona applications (Section 2.4) are built using these
operations.
Each Persona user is identified using a single public key and stores her own
(encrypted) data with a storage service. We assume for now that users with existing
relationships exchange their public keys and storage service locations out of band2
Storage services support two operations for data storage and retrieval: put and get,
which mimic the store and retrieve operations of a hash table. Storage is a resource
in Persona, and users may grant other users (or groups) the ability to store (put)
onto their storage service using the operations described in this section. Storage
services are a specialized case of the broader class of Persona applications and are
described in more detail in Section 2.4.1.
We use the notation shown in Table 2.1. In the algorithm listings, u : 〈protocol step〉
means user u invokes the specified step.
2.3.1 Operations
Persona operations allow users to manage group membership and mandate
access to resources. The operations combine ABE and traditional cryptography,
2We describe in Chapter 3 and in Section 4.4.2 how this can be done securely in-band.
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Term Definition
u.SS u’s storage service location
u.K Key K created by u
(PK ,TSK ) PKC public/secret keypair
(APK ,AMSK ) ABE public/master secret keypair
ASK ABE user secret key
AS Access structure
TKeyGen() Generate RSA keypair
TEncrypt(K,m) RSA encrypt m with key K
TDecrypt(K, c) RSA decrypt ciphertext c
TSign(K,m) RSA sign m with key K
ABESetup Generate an attribute public key and master secret key
ABEKeyGen(K, attrs) Generate an attribute secret key with attributes attrs
ABEEncrypt(K,m,AS) ABE encrypt m with key K and access structure AS
ABEDecrypt(SK, PK, c) ABE decrypt ciphertext c with secret key SK
Table 2.1: Notation used in this paper.
allowing individuals to be securely added to groups defined using ABE and allowing
group members authenticated access to abstract resources.
2.3.1.1 DefineRelationship
Users invoke the DefineRelationship function to add individuals to a group. The
user generates an appropriate attribute secret key using the ABEKeyGen function,
encrypts this key using the target user’s public key, and stores the encrypted key on
her storage service. The target user can retrieve this encrypted key using a process
described in Section 2.3.3, decrypt it, and use it as necessary.
Algorithm 1 DefineRelationship(u1, attrs, u2)
u1: A ← ABEKeyGen(u1.AMSK , attrs)
u1: C ← TEncrypt(u2.PK , A)
u1: u1.SS.put(H ′(u2.PK ), C)
. . .
u2: C ← u1.SS.get(H ′(u2.PK ))
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Example Usage: Alice wants to confer the attribute ‘friend’ upon Bob. Alice
creates K = Alice.ASK‘friend’, an ABE key associated with the ‘friend’ attribute.
Alice computes C = TEncrypt(Bob.PK , K) after obtaining Bob’s public key from
out-of-band communication with Bob. Alice stores C on her storage service at the
location H ′(Bob.PK ), where H ′(·) is a hash function defined in Section 2.3.3. Bob
retrieves C from Alice’s storage service and decrypts it, gaining the ability to decrypt
content guarded by the attribute ‘friend’. Although any user can retrieve C from
its well-known location, only Bob can decrypt it.
2.3.1.2 DefineTransitiveRelationship
The DefineTransitiveRelationship function allows a user Alice to define groups
based on a group defined by another user, Bob.
Alice creates a new attribute to describe the new group ‘bob-friend’ and gen-
erates an ASK‘bob-friend’ with that attribute. Alice encrypts ASK‘bob-friend’ with the
access structure (‘friend’) using Bob’s attribute public key and stores the ciphertext
on her storage service (Algorithm 2).
Algorithm 2 DefineTransitiveRelationship(u1,APK ,
access structure AS, attrs)
u1: A ← ABEKeyGen(u1.AMSK , attrs)
u1: C ← ABEEncrypt(u1.APK , A,AS)
u1: u1.SS.put(H ′(AS, u1.APK ), C)
Users with the attribute ‘friend’ in Bob’s ABE domain may retrieve and de-
crypt this key and use it to view content encrypted within Alice’s ABE domain.
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Alice may include a traditional keypair, used for authentication to ACLs, in the
ciphertext C. We describe how Bob’s friends retrieve these keys in Section 2.3.3.
Example Usage: Alice is advertising a party on an OSN and wants to invite
Bob and any of Bob’s friends. Alice discovers that Bob uses the attribute ‘friend’
to define who his friends are. Alice generates the group identity traditional PKC
keypair (PK ,TSK ) for authentication, creates the new attribute ‘bob-friend’, and
generates the attribute secret key A = Alice.ASK‘bob-friend’. Alice calculates
C = ABEEncrypt(Bob.APK , [A, (PK ,TSK )] , ‘friend’)
and stores it on her storage service at H ′(‘friend’, Bob.APK ). Alice also performs
AssignRightsToGroup to generate group identity keys and instruct the application
providing the event advertising service that PK can be used to authenticate RSVPs.
Bob sends to each of his friends a link to the application that directs them to
Alice’s event. Bob’s friends cannot initially view the data, so they get C, decrypt
it, and view the event. They then get the group identity key, which allows them to
authenticate and RSVP to the event.
2.3.1.3 AssignRightsToIdentity
Resource owners use AssignRightsToIdentity to provide other users specific
rights to named resources. An example of such a right would be the ability to
store data on another user’s storage service; we describe other resources and uses in
Section 2.4.
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To assign rights, the user instructs the resource’s home to add a (public key,
set of rights) pair to the resource’s ACL. If the public key was already in the ACL,
then the rights are changed to those specified in the new rights set (Algorithm 3).
Algorithm 3 AssignRightsToIdentity(u1, rights,
PK , resource r, owner o)
u1: o.chACL(r,PK , rights)
User u2 who possesses TSK may exercise the named rights on the resource by
authenticating to the resource’s home node using TSK .
Example Usage: Alice wants to give Bob the ability to put data on her
storage service. Alice instructs her storage service to create a new ACL rule based
on Bob.PK that allows write access. Bob later calls the put function on the location
L with the world readable data m. Alice’s storage service issues a nonce n, and Bob
replies with TSign(Bob.TSK , [n, “write(L,m)” ]). Alice’s storage service verifies the
signature against Bob.PK , authenticating Bob’s write according to Alice’s access
policy.
2.3.1.4 AssignRightsToGroup
The AssignRightsToGroup function allows a user Alice to provide resource ac-
cess to a group G rather than to an individual. The group is specified using attributes
defined in Alice’s ABE domain.
First, Alice creates a new (PK ,TSK ) pair specifically for G. Alice ABE-
encrypts this keypair with an access structure that identifies members of G. Alice
stores the resulting ciphertext on her storage service. This pair of PKC keys becomes
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the group identity and Alice can assign rights according to AssignRightsToIdentity.
The pseudocode is presented in Algorithm 4.
Algorithm 4 AssignRightsToGroup(u1, rights,
access structure AS, resource r, owner o)
u1: (PK ,TSK )← TKeyGen()
u1: C ← ABEEncrypt(u1.APK , (PK ,TSK ),AS)
u1: u1.SS.put(H ′(AS,APK ), C)
u1: AssignRightsToIdentity(u1, rights,PK , r, o)
Example Usage: Alice wants to give her friends and her family the ability
to put data on her storage service. Alice defines the group G as the users who
have ‘friend’ or ‘family’ in their ASK in Alice’s ABE domain. Alice creates K =
(PKG,TSKG), and stores
C = ABEEncrypt(Alice.APK , K, (‘friend’ or ‘family’))
on her storage service. Anyone who possesses either of these attribute keys can
retrieve C, decrypt it with their ASK , and use TSKG to authenticate to store data
on the storage service as described in AssignRightsToIdentity.
2.3.2 Revocation of Group Membership
Removing a group member requires re-keying: all remaining group members
must be given a new key. Data encrypted with the old key remains visible to the
revoked member. The nominal overhead is linear in the number of group members
but it may be possible to reduce it [92].
An ABE message can be encrypted with an access structure that specifies an
inequality (“keyYear < 2009”), and the message can be decrypted only if a user
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possesses a key that satisfies the access structure. This facility can be used to
provide keys to new group members such that they cannot decrypt old messages
sent to the group.
2.3.3 Publishing and Retrieving Data
Private user data in Persona is always encrypted with a symmetric key3. The
symmetric key is encrypted with an ABE key corresponding to the group that is
allowed to read this data. The group is specified by an access structure as described
in Section 2.2.3. This two phase encryption allows data to be encrypted to groups;
reuse of the symmetric key allows Persona to minimize expensive ABE operations.
Users put (encrypted) data onto their storage service and use applications to
publish references to their data. Data references have the following format:
〈tag, storage service, key-tag, key-store〉
The tag and storage service specify how to retrieve the encrypted data item, and
the key-tag and key-store specify how to obtain a decryption key.
Users read data by retrieving both the item and the key. Suppose item i is
encrypted with symmetric key s. If user u1 wants to read i and u1’s local cache or
own storage service does not contain s, u1 can retrieve the ABE-encrypted s using
the key-tag and key-store information in the reference. s is encrypted under the
access structure AS in the ABE domain defined by APK (u1 can infer both from the
encrypted key). u1 tries to decrypt s using her ABE secret key, and if successful,
3Users may store public data in plain-text to reduce overhead.
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decrypts i using s. u1 stores s, encrypted with her own public key, on her own
storage service for future use. The encrypted key is stored at H(AS,APK ), where
H(·) is a hash function. If s is instead associated with traditional public key PK ,
u1 stores the encrypted s at H(PK ).
Suppose user u2 wants to encrypt a message for a set of users specified by
access structure AS in the ABE domain with public key APK . The domain may
belong to u2 or to some other user; u2 only needs to know the public parameters for
this domain in order to encrypt.
u2 looks for a symmetric key for this group by invoking u2.SS.get(H(AS,APK )).
Such a key would exist if u2 had previously encrypted or decrypted messages for
this group. If the retrieval succeeds and the encrypted symmetric key is found, u2
decrypts it using his own public key and obtains the symmetric key s.
If the retrieve fails, u2 constructs a new symmetric key s, encrypts it with
his own PKC public key and stores it in u2.SS under the tag H(AS,APK ). u2
further encrypts s using ABEEncrypt with access structure AS and APK and stores
this ABE-encrypted symmetric key on u2.SS with the tag H ′(AS,APK ). H ′ is a
hash function different from H . By construction, the ABE-encrypted key can be
decrypted exactly by those users who belong to the group to which the message is
encrypted. This group may not include u2. If u2 wishes to encrypt s with traditional
PKC instead of ABE, u2 encrypts with public key PK and stores the encrypted key
at H ′(PK ).
Finally, u2 encrypts the message using s and stores it using tag M . u2 can
22
then publish a reference to this item of the form:
〈M,u2.SS,H
′(AS,APK ), u2.SS〉
Other users resolve the reference by invoking u2.SS.get(M) which will retrieve the
original message encrypted with s.
In this example, u2 obtained the decryption key from his own storage service
(or created a new key and put it on his own storage service). In general, however, u2
may already know a different key for this group (for example, one that was used by
a different user to encrypt to the same group) that is stored on some other storage
service. Instead of creating his own key, u2 may choose to refer to this pre-existing
key instead.
2.4 Applications
Persona users interact using applications. Even core functions of current OSNs,
including the Facebook Wall or Profile, exist in Persona as applications. In this
section, we describe how applications use the group key and resource management
operations of Section 2.3.
Persona applications export a set of functions (an API) and a set of resources
over which those functions operate. When there are resources, such as file stores or
documents, two functions are expected in the API. First, register allocates a resource
for a principal (to create a Wall, for example). Registration with an application re-
turns a reference to the newly-allocated resource to the client. Second, chACL allows
the owning principal to define access restrictions via ACLs: for a given resource and
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a given principal, permit an operation. Applications will support further operations,
as we describe below, starting with the basic storage service.
2.4.1 Storage Service
Storage is a basic Persona application that enables users to store personal
data, make it available to others who request it, and sublet access to storage for
applications to use for per-user metadata. A user trusts a storage service to reliably
store data, provide it upon request, and protect it from overwrite or deletion by
unauthorized users. A user does not trust a storage service to keep data confidential,
relying instead on encryption to guard private information.
The storage service exports both get and put functions. The storage appli-
cation returns data whenever the get is invoked with a valid tag. The invoking
principal is not authenticated or validated, since the expectation is that data is
protected via encryption.
The put function requires the invoking principal n to authenticate to the stor-
age application. When n wants to put data, she presents her public key K and the
store identifier s to the storage application. The storage application ensures that
(K, put) exists in the resource ACL corresponding to s, and authenticates n using a
challenge-response protocol. n may write into s if the authentication succeeds.
Applications must store the metadata they have constructed. They can pro-
vide their own storage or use a storage service. If the application provides its own
storage resource, the application returns a handle to the resource when a user reg-
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isters with the application. The user can then call AssignRightsToIdentity to give
other users access to the application’s storage resource.
The user can instead provide the storage resource to the application and invoke:
AssignRightsToIdentity(user, write, App.PK , c, user.SS)
where c is a storage resource on user.SS, to allow the application to write onto the
user’s storage server. The user now registers with the application, passing it the
storage resource c in which to store the metadata:
R← App.register(user.PK , c)
In turn, the application returns a reference (R) to the resource corresponding to the
application instance.
To prevent an attack in which another user u2 pretends to own c, the registering
user must prove that he owns c. He does this by writing a nonce provided by the
application into c. The application ensures the nonce is present before writing.
2.4.2 Collaborative Data
The predominant method of sharing data in OSNs is via collaborative multi-
reader/writer applications. For instance, the quintessential Facebook application,
the Wall, is a per-user forum that features posts and comments from the user and her
friends, the Facebook Photos application stores comments and tags for each picture
and displays them to friends, the MySpace comments section allows friends to write
to a user’s page and read others’ comments, and each photograph posted to Flickr
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has a page where members of the Flickr community can comment on photographs.
Instead of re-implementing each OSN application in Persona, we present a generic
multi-reader multi-writer application named Doc. Doc can be used as a template
for implementing a variety of OSN applications, as we describe in Sections 2.4.2.1–
2.4.2.4.
Doc is organized around a document shared between collaborating users. Users
register with the Doc application and create a new Page. The application associates
a resource with this Page, and allows the user to provide read or write access to
other users (or groups). The Page metadata contains references to encrypted data;
the application is responsible for formatting this data for display. Users who are
allowed to write to the Page contact the application with data references, and Doc
updates the Page appropriately. The Page can be stored by the application or on a
storage server specified by the original user (in which case the user has to provide
the Doc with write access to the Page stored on the storage server). We describe
these steps next.
Reading the Page. To allow Bob to read content in her Page, Alice must
give Bob appropriate keys and a reference to her Doc. In particular, Alice must
provide an attribute secret key ASK that will allow him to decrypt (some subset of)
the data in the Page. Alice decides which attributes Bob should get and calls
DefineRelationship(Alice, attrs,Bob)
to issue an ASK to Bob. Obviously, Alice may already have given Bob these at-
tributes, in which case this step can be skipped. In either case, she provides him
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with a reference to her Page.
Bob can now retrieve the Page metadata, resolve data references, and decrypt
(potentially only a subset of) the Page data.
Writing to the Page. Alice may want to provide Bob with the ability to
write to her Page, where writing is a function exported by the Doc application. She
does so by adding Bob’s public key to the Page’s resource ACL by invoking:
AssignRightsToIdentity(Alice, write, Bob.PK , D,Doc)
Bob may now write onto the Page. Bob stores (appropriately encrypted) data
onto a storage-server and notifies the Doc of a write onto Alice’s Page. The Doc
application must authenticate Bob and ensure that his public key is in Alice’s Page’s
ACL with the proper right. If the authentication succeeds and Alice has provided
Bob the write right, then the Doc application updates the Page metadata (either
stored at the application or on a storage server specified by Alice) with the data
reference provided by Bob. The interpretation of the Page metadata is application-
specific.
Alice may authorize multiple users to write to the same Page. Conflicting
updates or concurrent writes are handled by the Doc application, possibly by storing
the Page as an append-only log. Users need not encrypt using a single access
structure, and may choose any access structure they desire. They may even write
onto a Page using an access structure that cannot be decrypted by some of the
Page’s readers.
In summary, Doc is a general multi-reader/writer template for storing and
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formatting metadata with references to encrypted content. Doc can easily be tailored
to implement many useful OSN applications, as we demonstrate next.
2.4.2.1 Wall using Doc
The Facebook Wall is a multi-user collaborative application that allows a user’s
friends to read messages, post messages, and comment on posts onto a shared doc-
ument, called the user’s Wall. Doc can be used to (almost trivially) implement the
Wall application. Unlike the Facebook Wall, the Persona Wall is distributed: it
allows users to choose where the Wall metadata is stored. All posts and comments
are stored on storage servers owned by the poster/commenter. The Wall document
itself contains rendering information and references to writes onto the wall. These
references must be resolved (i.e., the data fetched from appropriate storage servers)
and decrypted before rendering the Wall. End-user applications may intelligently
cache data and keys to reduce rendering latency.
2.4.2.2 Chat and Status Updates over Doc
A chat application can use Doc as the template. A chat session is a shared
document to which the chat host invites other users (and provides them write access
to the chat Doc). The chat application has to implement auxiliary UI functions (such
as an invite notification, and polling for new messages), but the basic structure
follows that of a simple Doc onto which users may append messages.
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Doc can also be used to implement user-specific status updates. The user
creates a status Doc and provides read-only access to other users (or groups) who
can periodically read the Doc to receive updates. The reference to the status update
Doc may be obfuscated such that unauthorized users are not able to detect changes
in status (even if they are not able to decrypt the status message).
2.4.2.3 News Feed using Doc
The news feed in Facebook collects “stories” from other applications to provide
a temporal view of Facebook activity. In Persona, the user provides the news feed
with a list of applications that she wants to appear in her feed, and an APK and AS
(or perhaps several access structures along with a policy dictating when to use each
access structure) with which to encrypt the feed. Only the user may change the list
of monitored applications. The news feed application retrieves the metadata from
the selected applications and parses it to create a history of changes to the user’s
applications’ metadata. The application writes this history as a user would write a
Page; only the news feed may write to this metadata. Viewing the feed consists of
viewing the Page. The contents of the Page are visible to anyone that can satisfy
AS.
2.4.2.4 Other Applications
Other popular Facebook applications such as Profiles, Photos, Groups, and
Events can be implemented using Doc as well. These applications can be imple-
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mented by altering the interpretation and presentation of metadata and tailoring
the API to the relevant task. Though Doc is sufficient for many Facebook applica-
tions, we consider examples of existing applications that require additional features
in the following sections.
2.4.3 Selective Revelation
The user may want to share some personal data with an application. One such
example is an application that allows users to search for others. Alice can choose
exactly the information by which other users can find her by only sharing that
data with a Search application. Another example is the Where I’ve Been Facebook
application [117]. Users enter a list of countries or cities that they have lived in,
visited, or want to visit, and the application shows a map with these locations
highlighted. Users can also compare maps with another user to see which locations
they have in common.
In order to permit applications that post-process personal data, we allow them
to decrypt certain data by giving them an ASK . Alice encrypts a list of cities she has
visited with the access structure (‘classmates’ or ‘where-ive-been’). She generates
an ASK and encrypts it with the Where I’ve Been application’s PK :
DefineRelationship(Alice, ‘where-ive-been’,Where I’ve Been)
When she registers to use the application, she gives it a reference to the encrypted
key. The application retrieves the key and can now decrypt and parse Alice’s list of
cities to produce the highlighted map. This general approach of selectively revealing
30
user data to applications has been discussed earlier in [47], and, since the publication
of this work, has been integrated into modern OSNs and mobile devices in the form
of permission requests during application installation.
Application functionality that can be implemented without revealing personal
information is surprisingly broad; however, in some cases, the application must
compute transforms over the user’s data. This is the case for the Where I’ve Been
application, especially when it has to compare the locations of multiple users. We
return to the general problem of structuring private applications and the tussle
between application functionality and user privacy in Section 2.7, and describe a
general framework for untrusted third-party assisted rendezvous in Chapter 4.
2.4.4 Applications that use the social graph
The graph of social connections between Persona users is not public. It is
realized only in the collections of public keys of friends a user stores, and given
meaning only through the assignment of attributes using DefineRelationship. This
obscurity of friend links frustrates applications such as those that analyze the graph
of connections to help connect with more friends (People You May Know) or to
visualize interconnections between friends (the Friend Wheel).
To enable these applications, users have two options. A user may publish
social links to each application using selective revelation or by directly uploading a
set of relationships. Alternatively, a single, somewhat trusted social link application
might provide access to other applications.
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Published edges in the social graph are protected just as other data in Persona:
encrypted to be hidden from arbitrary users and applications, but exported to chosen
users and useful applications that may access only what they require.
2.4.5 Inherently private applications
Persona allows for potential applications which are not realistic on OSNs with-
out privacy. For instance, a user might want to have a Medical Record application
where she stores her medical data. She might not want her employer or her friends
to see her data, but she would want to share it with her doctor. She may even have
many doctors, and it may be helpful for them to collaborate in a central location.
There is no technical difference between this application and Doc. However, these
applications are uniquely available on Persona because they operate on sensitive
private data.
2.5 Implementation
Our Persona implementation consists of two Persona applications (a storage
service and a customizable Doc application) and a browser extension for viewing
encrypted pages and managing keys.
2.5.1 Storage Service Application
Our Persona storage service application is an XML RPC server using PHP
and Apache with a MySQL database backend. The service implements the storage
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API described in Section 2.4.1.
2.5.2 Doc Application
We have implemented a Doc application (Section 2.4.2) in PHP with a MySQL
backend for storing metadata. Using the Doc as the base, we implemented Profile
and Wall applications.
Our Profile application presents an interface for the user to put data onto
her profile and read others’ profiles. The profile metadata (stored by the Profile
application in a MySQL database) consists of references to encrypted profile data
items. The Profile application allows only the registered user to write onto the
DocPage.
Our Wall application is identical in structure to the Profile, but allows other
users to write onto the Doc as well. The Wall application allows users to post new
items and reply to existing items. The Wall application constructs the Wall Doc
metadata file threading posts and replies. As with all applications, the posts and
references themselves are stored on other storage services, and the Wall application
operates using item references only.
2.5.3 Browser Extension
Users interact with Persona using a Firefox extension. The extension uses
the XPCOM framework in the Mozilla Build Environment to access the OpenSSL
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Figure 2.1: (a) CDF of the size of Facebook profile data items. (b) CDF of the
maximum, 95th percentile, and average of the size of data items per Facebook
profile. (c) CDF of the number of data items on Facebook profiles.
register with applications, encrypt data to groups, resolve data references, decrypt
data using appropriate keys, and facilitate out-of-band public-key exchange.
The browser extension is a trusted component in Persona; it is, in fact, the
only one. The extension implements a secure keystore, to which users upload their
private and public keys. The extension is given a list of public keys corresponding to
the user’s contacts. These keys are also stored (encrypted with the user’s public key)
on a storage service. When a user uses a new browser, the extension is initialized
with the user’s private key and a reference to the user’s permanent keystore. The
extension then downloads all of the other keys from the storage service.
When an encrypted Persona page is loaded, the extension processes the ele-
ments on the page and replaces them inline if necessary. There are two main types
of replacement: resolution of data references and replacement of special tags.
Data reference resolution. The extension parses item references, fetches
the items from storage services, decrypts the items, and verifies any signatures on
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those items. In our implementation, all data is signed by the creator and verified if
the signer’s key is known. Data resolution is recursive: encrypted data may contain
references to more encrypted data.
Our extension uses an XML-RPC javascript library capable of sending asyn-
chronous RPCs. During page processing, all data items are fetched asynchronously
using XMLHttpRequest. If the items are encrypted with an unknown key, the keys
are also fetched asynchronously. Once all keys and data items have been fetched, the
extension sequentially decrypts (and verifies) each item, and replaces the references
with the decrypted text. We are currently extending our implementation to decrypt
items as they arrive rather than waiting for all fetches to complete.
Replacement of special tags. Persona users may not want to share their
list of contacts (to be precise, their public keys) with applications. Instead, this list
is kept encrypted with the user’s public key on a storage service, which the extension
downloads upon initialization. The extension recognizes a “friend-form” tag sent by
an application, and replaces this with a drop-down box containing a list of the user’s
contacts. This facility is used in our Profile application to allow a user to view their
contacts’ profiles.
The extension allows users to encrypt data to groups. It replaces embedded
forms with a text box into which the user can enter private data. When the submit
button is pressed, the extension prompts the user for a policy under which to encrypt
the data, performs the encryption (constructing and publishing symmetric keys as
necessary), puts the encrypted data on the user’s storage service, and replaces the
form data with a reference to the encrypted data item.
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Caching. To reduce latency, the extension caches various keys and contact
information. This includes keys the user has created: an RSA public key (137 bytes
for 1024-bit moduli), RSA private key (680 bytes), APK (888 bytes), and AMSK
(156 bytes). For each friend, the extension caches their storage service information,
RSA public key, and APK . The extension also stores the ASK (the size varies: 407
bytes for one attribute and 266 bytes for each additional attribute) created for that
friend along with the attributes associated with the ASK . For each policy that the
user is a part of, whether it is created by the user or a friend, the extension caches
the RSA keypair and the symmetric key.
This caching and recycling of symmetric keys allows the extension to pay the
cost of an ABE decryption only when it encounters an item encrypted using a new
key reference. This will occur when the encryption uses a new policy (corresponding
to a new group) or an existing policy to which a user has encrypted with a new
symmetric key. The latter might occur if the encrypting user is not part of the group
and is unable to decipher existing symmetric keys for that policy. The common
operation of the extension does not require expensive ABE operations.
2.5.4 Integrating Persona with Facebook
Current deployments of OSNs underline their undeniable popularity. It is
not realistic to assume that Persona (or some other privacy-enabled network) will
replace existing OSNs. Instead, we expect users to migrate personal information
onto private networks, while continuing to use existing OSNs for public data.
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We have designed Persona to inter-operate with existing OSNs, and our pro-
totype integrates with Facebook. Persona applications are accessible as Facebook
applications and can interact with Facebook’s API, providing privacy-enabled ap-
plications through the familiar Facebook interface. Conversely, existing Facebook
applications can be made Persona-aware on a per-application basis. Users protect
their private data by storing it on Persona storage services rather than on Facebook;
only fellow Persona users will be able to access the data, and only if they are given
the necessary keys and access rights.
Using Persona applications within Facebook. Users log-in to Persona
by authenticating to the browser extension (which then decrypts and encrypts data
transparently), and then log-in to Facebook as normal. A Facebook-aware Persona
application is akin to any third-party Facebook application, and can be selected for
use as any other Facebook application. Unlike other applications, Persona appli-
cations use markup that is interpreted by the Persona browser extension, and are
aware of data references.
Traditional Facebook applications may use the Facebook API to communicate
to users by sending notifications, displaying items on the Facebook wall, and sending
application invitations. The same facilities are available to Persona applications. We
have implemented an abstract OSN interface that Persona applications use to access
OSN APIs. While our design is general, our current implementation has only been
tested with Facebook. Our Doc-based applications are accessible via Facebook as
Facebook applications.
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Figure 2.2: (a) Total time needed, in seconds, to present Facebook profiles composed
of encrypted data items. (b) CDF of total time to load Facebook profiles. (c) Total
time needed, in seconds, to decrypt encrypted data items in Facebook profiles in
the cool data set with 100 groups. Note the difference in scale from (a).
sona, existing Facebook applications may want to provide Persona users with the
ability to store private data. Minimally, each application has to be ported to operate
using Persona data references, though some applications that transform user data
may require a complete rewrite. We discuss application porting in Section 2.7.
2.6 Evaluation
In this section, we quantify the processing and storage requirements of Persona
and measure the time to render Persona-encrypted web pages.
The key parameters of our evaluation are the sizes and number of distinct
data elements that might be stored on a single Persona page. Each distinct element
represents a request to a storage server and may, if the policy and associated key
are unknown, also imply a request for a group key and its decryption with ABE.
This process represents the performance cost of Persona. We estimate these param-
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eters using Facebook as a model, combining real user profiles from Facebook with
observations of application-provided limits on the number of items per page.
User profiles can contain hundreds of data items. We use profile data in our
evaluation because it exposes the worst case performance of Persona, where users
must fetch and decrypt many individually encrypted data items. Our data is from
a crawl of Facebook profiles gathered in January, 2009. The crawl contains the
HTML of the profile pages of 90,269 users in the New Orleans network; of those
pages, 65,324 pages contain visible profiles, and 39 pages had miscellaneous errors
that left them unusable.
We parse these Facebook profiles into data items that could be individually
encrypted. First, we parse the document based on fields such as Name, Birthday,
Activities, Interests, etc. We then decompose fields which contain multiple items
separated by commas, bullet points, or line breaks. Under this decomposition, users
would be able to, for example, individually encrypt every TV show, book, and movie
that they enjoy, if they chose to do so.
Figure 2.1 (a) shows a CDF of the sizes of all data items and Figure 2.1 (b)
shows a CDF of the maximum, 95th percentile, and average data item sizes on
a per-profile basis. These plots show that most of the data items are small, but
many pages also have a few large items. We also present a CDF of the number of
data items per profile in Figure 2.1 (c). These figures provide a backdrop for the
performance of Persona: our results show that the number of data items on a page
determines the page load time.
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2.6.1 Desktop Performance
We evaluate our Persona implementation on a desktop computer using a 2.00
GHz processor and 2 GB of RAM. The desktop, storage service, and application
server are connected through a router which introduces an artificial delay, chosen
uniformly between 65ms and 85ms, on each packet. These values reflect high laten-
cies observed by King [32] and represent a case where the storage service is far away
from the user.
We use two experiment scenarios. The first, termed cool , represents Persona
in its initial state, when group symmetric keys must be retrieved from a storage
service and decrypted. The second, termed warm, represents Persona usage in the
steady state, when all symmetric keys associated with groups have been cached. We
repeat the cool experiment scenario three times, varying the number of user-defined
groups between 1, 10, and 100. We run only one warm experiment scenario since
no key fetches and no ABE decryptions are needed. In each data set, we randomly
assign each data item to one of the user-defined groups.
For each Facebook profile, we first encrypt and store each of the data items
in Persona. We then retrieve a page that contains references to all of these data
items. In the cool data set, we asynchronously fetch the keys needed to decrypt all
of the items in the page. In both cool and warm, we also asynchronously fetch the
encrypted data items themselves. Once all keys and data items have been fetched,
we decrypt the data items on the page, verify their signatures, and re-render the
page. For efficiency, rather than evaluating every profile, we evaluate a profile page
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drawn randomly from the set of all pages that have x items, for all values x for
which there is a profile with x items.
Page load time. Page load times increase linearly with the number of ele-
ments. Figure 2.2 (a) shows how long it takes to download, decrypt, and display the
profile page for each of our experiments, as a function of the number of data items
on the page. We extrapolate the distribution of page load times per Facebook profile
in Figure 2.2 (b). The median page load time is 2.3 seconds and the maximum is
13.7 seconds. Most pages consist of a few, small entries, so most are loaded quickly.
The cool data sets are comparable to the warm data set, indicating that retrieving
keys is not too expensive. These times may also represent a worst case; if users
aggregate their data more coarsely there will be fewer data items, requiring fewer
fetches and thus fewer round-trip times. Another possible improvement would be to
cache commonly retrieved data items, but we have not performed this optimization.
Encrypted data size. We show how much larger the encrypted data is for
individual data items in Figure 2.3a and for entire profile pages in Figure 2.3b.
There is a substantial increase in the size of the stored data, and this will affect
both the storage capacity of the storage services and the network resources required
to transfer data. The storage services are inherently distributed, so they should be




































Figure 2.3: (a) Total size of plaintext and stored (ciphertext and signature) data for
Facebook profile pages by number of data items on the page. (b) CDF of total size
of plaintext and stored (ciphertext and signature) data for Facebook profile pages.
2.6.2 Mobile Device ABE Performance
Mobile devices are increasingly used for limited access to OSNs. MySpace,
Facebook, and LinkedIn [112] all have iPhone applications, and there are many
twitter and instant messaging clients. Persona, to provide a substitute, must also be
realizable on mobile devices. Enabling mobile devices with Persona-based security
would enable users to exchange their current locations with friends but not third
parties, enabling functionality similar to that of Loopt [113] without trusting the
service provider.
The requirements for encryption performance of mobile OSN clients are a bit
different from their desktop counterparts. Because of their smaller screens and often
slower network connections, the requirements for decryption are less demanding:
when only a few messages may be retrieved or displayed at a time, decrypting only a
few items is necessary. Conversely, mobile devices tend to have limited computation
power and limited battery life, so the operations themselves should be reasonably
interactive.
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We cross-compiled the cpabe [99] libraries and their dependencies (pbc [53],
gmp, glib, openssl, gettext, libiconv, and libintl) for the iPhone SDK 2.2.1 [101].4
Some of these libraries (e.g., libcrypto from OpenSSL) are present on the device but
not included in the official SDK. Cryptographic operations supported on the device
may be implemented using hardware acceleration when applications are written
using Apple’s defined APIs; writing directly to the OpenSSL library forgoes these
potential advantages. In other words, our benchmark is sufficient to show that ABE
is practical on a widespread mobile device, but not intended to compare ABE or
AES performance from one device to another.
On a first-generation iPhone (620MHz ARM), decryption of ABE encrypted
text fragments smaller than 1KB takes approximately 0.254 seconds. This value is
the average time to decrypt 40 randomly-generated messages of 40 different sizes
drawn uniformly at random from 0 to 4095 bytes of 5 different access structures
having one to five attributes. Message size and access structure have little effect:
the message itself is encrypted using AES-128, and the access structure appears to
have a greater effect on the time to encrypt than to decrypt. Encryption times
average 0.926 seconds with one attribute (an average of 25 messages of 25 sizes;
some of this time is likely consumed by AES-128 key generation) and 0.43 seconds
for each additional attribute.
We believe that the 0.254 second object decryption time compares favorably
to the typical RTT of cellular data systems (Lee [50] reported a 417ms average RTT
4Patches to enable cross-compilation of these libraries using Apple’s gcc compiler are available
at http://www.cs.umd.edu/projects/persona
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for 1x EV-DO) and does not preclude a mobile Persona.
2.7 Discussion
Our Persona prototype and evaluation demonstrates new functionality and
reasonable performance. In this section, we discuss unexplored questions a large-
scale deployment will have to confront.
Factoring applications. Persona was motivated by the observation that current
OSN applications have complete access to user data. Current Persona applications,
on the other hand, have no access to user data and must operate entirely using
data references. Applications that act on user data must be given selective access as
described in Section 2.4.3. This approach is similar to how others [47] have discussed
statically classifying user data in OSNs for application access.
An alternate design is to refactor applications into one piece administered by
the application provider (as now), and another piece capable of transforming user
data that would be executed on a trusted host (likely, within the user’s browser).
Existing taint-tracking techniques [79, 95] can be used to guarantee that user-data
remains safe. This option relieves the user from thinking about what data should
be released to which applications; however, application design and implementation
must undergo a substantial change.
Factored data. Persona decouples application metadata from encrypted content.
This may lead to cases when one is available but not the other. Ideally, data and
metadata would share availability, but combining both might lead to unacceptable
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performance or violate storage policy (about where data might be stored). A scalable
policy-compliant design for a fate-sharing [17] dissemination infrastructure is an
open problem.
Deployment incentives. OSNs are popular, in part, because they are free. Per-
sona’s design requires users to contract with applications, and some applications,
such as the storage service, may have little incentive to provide free service. Users
may have to pay for this storage or agree to use some other service or applications in
exchange for free storage. Other applications—for instance, versions of Doc—may
augment the metadata with advertisements, which may provide a sustaining deploy-
ment model. As privacy-enhanced OSNs become popular, current OSN providers
may choose to incorporate privacy features, in effect supporting the Persona + Face-
book model we have implemented.
2.8 Conclusion: Persona in Perspective
Privacy controls provided by existing OSNs are not sufficient since they rely on
trusting the OSNs with data from which they can profit. We have shown how ABE
and traditional public key cryptography can be combined to provide the flexible,
user-defined access control needed in OSNs. We have described group-based access
policies and the mechanisms needed to provide decryption and authentication by
both groups and individuals. We have demonstrated the versatility of these oper-
ations in an OSN design called Persona, which provides privacy to users and the
facility for creating applications like those that exist in current OSNs.
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Persona was among the earliest work to solve the problem of privacy in OSNs,
and, as OSNs are a part of a rapidly developing industry, much has changed in the
three years since the original publication of the work. Privacy controls in popular,
centralized OSNs have improved to satisfy user complaints. In particular, the launch
of Google+ saw the introduction of “circles” for controlling the privacy of posted
information; these circles were well-received and vindicate the design decision of
attribute-based grouping in Persona. However, despite their improved privacy con-
trols, today’s popular OSNs still rely on a centralized service that the user must
trust in order to participate. Persona and other decentralized OSNs provide a level
of privacy and security that cannot be provided by a centralized service, by provid-
ing users the ability to choose with whom they will store their data and (through





OSNs have persuaded millions of users to give their offline identities an online
presence. While these OSN identities are convenient for online communication, they
risk impersonation [98] and may provide personal information that threatens the se-
curity of other systems [71, 114]. Users, aware that their personal information is
valuable, may choose only to allow their friends to see their information. However,
even correct privacy settings can be foiled if someone has infiltrated their circle of
friends. Users cannot trust that the person behind an online account is actually
their offline friend, even if that account has the correct picture and profile infor-
mation [11]. Solving the problem of OSN impersonation is necessary to establish a
secure, privacy-enabled OSN such as Persona (Chapter 2).
Many modern applications allow users to authenticate using an OSN account.
Authenticatr [72] shows that these identities can be a valuable tool in system design.
Unfortunately, an OSN provider is not equipped to verify user identities since the
provider knows almost nothing about its users other than what they themselves
supply, and that supplied data can be easily forged. Though OSN users are also
not able to identify arbitrary OSN users, they are actually well-equipped to detect
when an attacker is impersonating one of their friends.
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Offline users have ways of identifying a friend—such as recognizing her ap-
pearance or voice—that are either difficult or impossible in online communication.
Instead they can use exclusive shared knowledge for identification: they can identify
a friend (either online or offline) by asking questions that only she can answer.
Once the user identifies his friend, he can ask her to provide or verify a public
encryption key associated with her identity. By repeating this process with all of
his friends, the user bootstraps a public key infrastructure (PKI) that he can use
on the OSN, a PKI that is important for emerging OSN applications that require
security or privacy.
We1 face several challenges by verifying OSN identities with shared knowledge.
We must guarantee that shared knowledge remains secret or we open ourselves up
to impersonation attacks. Users may not share exclusive knowledge with all of their
friends, so the PKI we create may be limited in scope. Lastly, an impostor may
be able to guess the knowledge shared by a pair of users, so we must limit and, if
possible, detect such attacks.
Our contributions are the following. We show that existing protocols can be
used in an OSN to exchange keys without revealing shared knowledge. We perform
a user study that shows that strangers have less than a 2% chance of guessing
the answers to shared knowledge questions; this compares favorably to web-based
security questions—another identification scheme based on personal information—
which can be guessed 17% of the time by strangers [77]. We show that even when
users only exchange keys with a few friends, we can discover the keys of many friends
1This work [7] involved the collaboration of Bobby Bhattacharjee and Neil Spring.
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and friends-of-friends with a web of trust [81]. Finally, we show that the same web
of trust detects 80% of all successful impersonation attacks.
We organize this chapter as follows. In Section 3.2 we describe how to use
exclusive shared knowledge to distribute public keys and show that we can avoid
impersonation attacks with existing protocols. We describe our user study in Sec-
tion 3.3 and show that shared knowledge exists and can be used to identify friends.
We describe related work in Section 5 and conclude in Section 3.4.
3.2 Exclusive Shared Knowledge
The strength of exclusive shared knowledge lies in its secrecy, so we must
handle it delicately to prevent attacks. We seek a key exchange protocol in which
one user can use shared knowledge to verify another user’s offline identity, without
either user revealing that knowledge in the process.
3.2.1 Design
One user, the asker, wishes to verify the identity of her friend, the askee. The
users are communicating over an insecure channel and we assume their messages
can be intercepted by a man-in-the-middle attacker, the meddler. Key exchange
is asymmetric: in one instance of the protocol, the asker identifies the askee only.
Symmetry is not required in OSNs that have directed friend relationships, such as
Twitter. For symmetric OSNs like Facebook, we realize symmetry by repeating the
asymmetric protocol with the asker and askee roles reversed.
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We will apply exclusive shared knowledge in our protocol as follows. The asker
formulates a question Q with answer A that relies on the exclusive knowledge shared
between the asker and askee. At the end of the protocol, the asker will receive a
public key PK with the guarantee that the person who sent the key used the answer
A in the protocol, even though A is never communicated in any way.
3.2.2 Attacks
We first consider the askee impersonation attack. The meddler, though he
does not know A, may make a guess G that could be equal to A, especially if the
set of possible answers to Q is small. The meddler will attempt to use G to offer the
fake key FK instead. If G = A, the asker will receive FK and be convinced that it
belongs to the askee, meaning the impersonation is successful. However, if G 6= A,
the asker will be unable to verify the askee’s identity and may grow suspicious of an
impersonation attempt.
A meddler who can prevent messages from being delivered could also prevent
successful verification of the askee. The general problem of denial of service attacks
is outside of the scope of this work; we expect that existing techniques can be applied
straightforwardly to this setting.
Alternatively, the meddler could attempt to impersonate an asker rather than
the askee. The meddler chooses a question Q′ and asks it of the askee. The askee
does not reveal A′ in the protocol, so the meddler can only learn A′ if her guess G′
is correct. A′ is only useful information in a subsequent askee impersonation attack,
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and even then only if the asker chooses to use Q′ as a question.
In either of these attacks, the meddler can impersonate a person who is not
actually a user of the OSN by creating a fake account on the OSN with that person’s
information. The same attacks apply even when there is not a “real” asker or askee
for the meddler to impersonate, i.e., when the impersonated person does not have
an account on the OSN.
In order to maintain shared knowledge secrecy, the meddler must be unable to
recover A from the protocol even with an offline dictionary attack. Therefore, any
attempt to test whether G = A must require the cooperation of either the askee or
the asker, to limit the number of guesses a meddler may make.
3.2.3 Existing Protocols
Two existing protocols satisfy the requirements for our problem. Jablon [36]
describes SPEKE, a protocol designed to establish a secure channel between a client
and a server who share a common passphrase. As Jablon suggests, this can also
be used with shared knowledge as the passphrase between two users. SPEKE is
specifically designed to preserve the secrecy and require online verification of the
passphrase. The secure channel in SPEKE can be trivially used to exchange a
public key once the protocol is complete.
SPEKE achieves these properties by modifying the Diffie-Hellman protocol,
replacing the ordinarily fixed primitive base with a primitive base given by a well-
chosen function of the shared information. We omit further details of SPEKE.
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Ellison [23] describes a multi-question protocol that also satisfies the properties
we require. This protocol allows the asker to ask several questions before deciding
that she is in fact communicating with the askee. Although it may prevent some
honest users from exchanging keys successfully, askers and askees must limit the
number of verifications they will perform to reduce the number of guesses a meddler
may make.
3.2.4 Embedding SPEKE in an OSN
Facebook is one of many web-based OSNs, and we use it as an example of
how one would augment an existing OSN to support SPEKE. Facebook provides
private messages between users, which could be used as the communication channel
in SPEKE.
Several steps of the protocol require local cryptographic operations that must
not reveal certain information such as private keys or the answer. One can perform
the SPEKE protocol on an OSN by embedding the protocol in a Firefox extension.
SPEKE requires several messages, so the asker and askee must either visit the OSN
simultaneously or they must interleave their visits to the OSN several times to com-
plete the exchange. This solution is also appropriate for other OSNs; in particular,
Persona [6] already relies on a Firefox extension for cryptographic operations.
In addition to key exchange with SPEKE and exclusive shared knowledge, we
can increase a user’s view of trusted public keys through a web of trust built on
the OSN friend graph. Although users might hesitate to ascribe trust to all of their
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Facebook friends, they might be more willing to trust the friends they know well
enough to identify through exclusive shared knowledge. We consider the benefit of
using a web of trust in Section 3.3.2.2.
3.3 Can Users Ask Good Questions?
Since the security of our system relies on the ability of users to ask good
questions, we performed a real-world user study to determine whether users can do
so. This study presents a challenge that most user studies do not face: the results
depend on getting data about both participants and their friends. Rather than
bring individual users in for interviews, we perform our study directly on Facebook
to take advantage of the existing friendship information that Facebook provides.
We describe our user study, Bond Breaker, in this section.
Like many other viral Facebook applications, Bond Breaker is a social game.
We wanted to ensure that users had the right goals while using Bond Breaker, so
scoring in the game reflects desirable behavior in an actual system built for secure
key exchange. We also believed that a game – rather than a survey – might be seen
as fun and might convince users to encourage their friends to participate.
3.3.1 Bond Breaker Game Rules
We present the rules to the users before they begin playing Bond Breaker.
In Bond Breaker, users are rewarded for establishing bonds. A user establishes a
bond by asking a question of a friend, providing an answer, and getting the friend
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to provide the same answer; this is analogous to successful (one-way) completion of
the key exchange protocol in Section 3.2. Both the asker and the askee are rewarded
for successfully establishing a bond, and they are also rewarded for establishing a
bond in the other direction.
For example, Alice asks Bob, “Where did we meet for the first time?”, and
Alice and Bob answer, “a roller disco”, forming a bond. Bob independently asks
Alice, “What color is my bike?”, and both answer “blue”, forming another bond in
the other direction.
As the name Bond Breaker suggests, we also encourage users to break bonds.
A user is rewarded when she guesses the correct answer to a question that was not
intended for her. A user may break a bond in this way even if the intended askee is
unable to answer the question correctly, since this still corresponds to a successful
attack in the actual key exchange protocol. A given asker and askee may establish
only one bond at any given time: if that bond is broken, they may try to use a
new question. Since we want to discourage users from asking and answering poor
questions, we penalize the asker and askee whenever a bond is broken.
Continuing our previous example, Eve guesses the answers to Alice and Bob’s
questions. To the first, she guesses “high school”, and fails to break their bond. To
the second, she guesses “blue”, breaking the bond from Bob to Alice. Unless Eve
knows more information about Alice and Bob, Alice’s question is good because there
are many places to choose from and the answer is relatively obscure. Bob’s question
is not as good because the answer is easily guessed.
We reward and punish users based on a point system and include a leaderboard
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Asker Askee Meddler
Creating a bond +1 (each) +1 (each) -
Breaking a bond -2 (once) -1 (once) +1 (each)
Table 3.1: Scoring in Bond Breaker. Askers and askees earn points for each bond
they create and only lose points once per bond if the bond is broken. Each meddler
earns points for breaking a bond, even if the bond was already broken by another
meddler.
to give users incentive to earn points. We present our scoring rules in Table 3.1.
The asker and askee are penalized once for having a bond broken, but arbitrarily
many meddlers can earn points for breaking the same bond. We penalize the asker
more than the askee when a bond is broken since the asker chose the question and
has more at stake in the key exchange protocol; if the bond is established and then
broken, the net result would be that the asker loses one point and the askee breaks
even.
In our study, each meddler only gets one guess per question, corresponding
to the requirement that askers and askees limit the number of answer verifications
they will make. In practice, some users asked questions that the askee was unable
to answer only because of slight formatting problems and then asked the same ques-
tion again, giving meddlers an extra chance to answer. We used case-insensitive
matching as the only transformation on answers and have not evaluated any other
transformations. Any transformation that makes matching more lax will favor us-
ability at the expense of security: the easier it is for friends to identify each other,
the easier it will be for an attacker to guess the correct answer.
The rules that we have described provide an effective analogy between success
in Bond Breaker and success in an actual system. Users are rewarded for asking
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questions of as many users as possible, but punished whenever those questions can
be answered by a meddler; in a real system users would obtain benefit from learning
many public keys and could incur substantial costs when meddlers convince them
to use false public keys. By rewarding users for breaking bonds, we provide an
incentive to do so, just as meddlers in an actual system would have incentive to
falsify public key information. We believe that Bond Breaker measures well the
usability of shared knowledge for identity verification.
3.3.1.1 Data Collection
We opened Bond Breaker to the public on April 3rd, 2009 and collected data
for three months. We primarily advertised by word-of-mouth, but also with flyers
and a Facebook advertisement. In total, 171 people agreed to participate in Bond
Breaker, but 70 of the participants did not ask, answer, or attempt to meddle in any
of the questions. Of the remaining 101 active users, 92 chose to ask or answer at
least one question while 9 chose only to meddle. In total, there were 225 questions,
200 answers from the askees, and 300 answers from meddlers.
The friend graph among participants in our study is not as densely connected
as we would expect in a complete OSN friend graph. 41% of the active users had
only one or two friends actively participating in the study. Through user feedback
we found that this was a combination of the following: users did not want to bother
their friends with what could be seen as spam invitations, the signup process required
reading a detailed description of the rules, and users felt discouraged from using the
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Figure 3.1: Friend graph for active users in Bond Breaker.
application if none of their friends had signed up for it yet. In contrast, 14% of active
users had ten or more friends participating; many of these users were connected to
each other, forming the densely connected core in Figure 3.1. Most of our results
do not depend on how densely connected the friend graph is, but we may be able to
obtain more accurate results about the web of trust if we obtain a more complete
friend graph in the future.
3.3.2 Results
We use the results of our user study to answer the following questions. Can
users easily formulate answerable questions based on exclusive shared knowledge?






















Figure 3.2: Fraction of friends to whom users asked questions, created bonds, and
had bonds broken.
use these local verifications to bootstrap a PKI, similar to the PGP web of trust?
3.3.2.1 Question Success Rate
We first consider whether the participants were able to successfully use shared
knowledge to establish bonds. Figure 3.2 shows that users had varying degrees of
success in their ability to pose questions to friends: about a fifth of the users did
not ask questions of any of their friends, another fifth asked questions of all of their
friends, and the remainder were distributed nearly evenly. However, when users did
pose a question, the friend answered correctly 69% of the time.
Unlike askees, meddlers are rarely able to answer questions, with only a 6%
success rate. Table 3.2 shows that strangers meddled with nearly as many questions
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Friend Stranger All
Unsuccessful 50% 44% 94%
Successful 5% 1% 6%
All 55% 45% 100%
Table 3.2: Breakdown of meddling attempts based on whether the meddler was a
stranger or a friend and whether the meddler was successful or unsuccessful.
as friends. However, five out of six successful break attempts were by a friend of
either the asker or askee. Though users may have spiteful friends who try to interfere
with their efforts, we expect most attacks in practice to come from strangers. The
ratio of successful attacks to attempts is only 9% for friends and 2% for strangers.
To provide a point of comparison, web-based security questions can be answered
28% of the time by friends and 17% of the time by strangers [77]. Though this
provides a point of comparison to deployed systems, there are significant differences
between the problems being solved and the experimental methodologies of these two
studies. This comparison is meant only to put the results in context.
From these results we conclude that users are only able to use shared knowledge
with some of their friends, and it is usually difficult for a meddler to guess the answer
to a shared knowledge question.
3.3.2.2 Web of Trust
Though we have demonstrated that many users only formed bonds with only
a small fraction of their friends, we now show that users can learn the keys of other
users in the OSN. Figure 3.3 shows the bonds and broken bonds between active
users. Based on this graph, we define a user U ’s web of trust to be the set of users
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Figure 3.3: Bond graph in Bond Breaker; solid lines with filled arrows represent
successful bonds and dashed lines with empty arrows represent broken bonds.
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reached by breadth-first search on the directed bond edges beginning at user U .
The web of trust may also be limited to a fixed number of hops away from U ; a
web of trust restricted to 2 hops would include U , any of U ’s friends to which U
has established a bond (hop 1), and any user reachable from those users (hop 2).
Restricting the web of trust sacrifices graph coverage for the sake of security. Our
definition assumes that trust is related to hops in the friend graph, but in practice
we advocate the use of explicit, user-defined trust information.
With a web of trust, the user can do two things: discover the identities of
users she does not bond with first-hand, and detect when an attacker has falsified
an identity. Since most OSN communication is between friends or between friends-
of-friends (FoFs), we focus on learning the keys of those users.
We first show a CDF of the fraction of friends and friends-of-friends reachable
via a web of trust in Figure 3.4. If we restrict the web of trust to 2 hops, meaning
that the user trusts her friends to attest to keys belonging to her FoFs, 18% of users
can identify more than half of their friends or FoFs in the OSN. However, if we do
not restrict the web of trust, half of the users with at least one outgoing bond can
reach at least 73% of their friends or FoFs. This suggests that the web of trust is a
powerful tool in creating a PKI for friends and FoFs and that the study of trust in
OSNs deserves further research.
We also discovered that 12 of the 15 unique broken bonds could be detected by
the unrestricted web of trust. That is, for 80% of the broken bonds, there is a path
of good bonds from the asker to the askee in the unrestricted web of trust. We can


















Fraction of friends and FoFs covered by web of trust
1 Hop (Direct Verification)
2 Hop (Trust Friends)
3 Hops (Trust FoFs)
5 Hops
All Hops
Figure 3.4: CDF of the fraction of friends and FoFs reachable through the web of
trust, by web of trust restriction. 36% of the users have no outgoing bonds, so they
gain nothing from the web of trust.
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Figure 3.5: Carl incorrectly believes that the account created by Ivy belongs to
Alice, and his web of trust does not detect his error.
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use Facebook account ids to identify nodes in the web of trust, but an impostor
could create a fake account to thwart this. Figure 3.5 shows an example of how the
web of trust could fail: the path of good bonds (Carl to Bob to Alice) points to a
different node in the friend graph than the broken bond (Carl to Ivy), so Carl will
be oblivious to Ivy’s attack if he cannot discover that the accounts created by Alice
and Ivy refer to the same offline identity. In order to use the web of trust to detect
impostors, bond edges must therefore encode information about offline identity to
be able to match fake accounts to their real counterparts.
These results demonstrate that we can bootstrap a PKI that provides the keys
of friends and FoFs in an OSN. This PKI is distributed and decentralized; we do not
require a centralized authority and we can exchange keys entirely online, as opposed
to the offline key signing parties of PGP. This PKI is a critical tool for providing
security and privacy in emerging OSN-based applications.
Even though shared knowledge is a good starting point for a social PKI, it is
not the only technique. We should provide users with as many independent options
for in-band key exchange as possible, and shared knowledge is just one of those
options. We consider another technique for exchanging keys based on mobile device
proximity in Section 4.4.2.
3.4 Conclusion
Impersonation is a fundamental problem of OSNs. We have described how to
use exclusive shared knowledge to allow users to take responsibility for identifying
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their own friends in an OSN in a completely online way. We described a user study,
Bond Breaker, that takes takes advantage of existing Facebook friend information
to study our idea in a real setting. We demonstrated through Bond Breaker that
exclusive shared knowledge is a practical tool for identifying friends in an OSN and
that users can establish a PKI among their friends and friends-of-friends with a web
of trust.
Though Bond Breaker reveals the potential of exclusive shared knowledge, it
does not test the extent of its use. In both the feedback we received from par-
ticipating users and from our own experience with the Bond Breaker application,
we observed that (1) users have trouble creating questions with difficult-to-guess
answers, but (2) users can come up with many weak questions that collectively are
a thorough test of the askee’s shared knowledge. To facilitate the identification of
friends, we should take advantage of the weak shared knowledge that users possess
more abundantly. We believe that the use of multiple identifying questions may be
able to bridge the gap between the results we have presented and a complete PKI,





We1 consider the problem of “rendezvous” over the Internet: two entities wish
to communicate but do not know each other’s “addresses”. More generally, users
may want to find entities that possess specific attributes. This general problem
appears (and is solved) in many guises, e.g. users of a social network look for other
users with the same interest; users wish to construct a secure communication link to
another whom they met in the past; peers sharing a file on BitTorrent may need to
find peers; Bluetooth devices need to pair before they can communicate; client pro-
grams may need to reach a server that is behind a NAT device. Prior solutions have
relied on local area broadcast or multicast (e.g, mDNS [16] and Bluetooth [102]),
network layer services (e.g., IP anycast [68], GIA [40]), modifications to DNS (e.g.,
application-layer anycast [10], CDN redirection [20]), trusted-third parties (STUN
servers for NAT [74], matchmaking services such as match.com), or untrusted well-
known servers (location-based rendezvous protocols [55]). While efficient for the
domains they were designed for, these ad-hoc solutions do not provide a general
solution to rendezvous problems. For example, mDNS, which relies on link-layer
multicast, is only useful if two devices are on the same local network; two co-located
1This work involved the collaboration of Bobby Bhattacharjee and Matt Lentz.
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3G devices cannot discover each other using mDNS. Bluetooth discovery can be used
to find nearby resources, the discovery range is limited to a few tens of meters. Ex-
isting infrastructure-based solutions are either tailored for network-layer discovery
(anycast) or require participants to trust the server (social matchmaking) thereby
limiting applicability. We assert that rendezvous is an useful- and common-enough
abstraction that it merits being factored out and implemented as a standalone ser-
vice.
We propose a general pseudonymous rendezvous abstraction, called Twain,
that can be applied in any of the aforementioned contexts and can be realized as
a publicly available service on the Internet. Twain users construct pseudonymous
identities and associate attributes that they wish to be discovered by (or query for)
with these identities. Using the attributes provided by users, an untrusted third
party finds initial matches. In a way, Twain is a formalization of a “process” similar
to those employed by matchmaking web sites, where users provide information which
is used by the site to generate potential matches. In Twain however, users specify
attributes to match on, and then, they may use an interactive protocol brokered by
the service to validate that the match before committing to revealing their identities.
Our design goal is to construct a template that can be used for rendezvous in
a completely application-agnositic manner. Thus, Twain must efficiently a) capture
location context that is implicit in solutions that employ network-layer abstractions
(e.g., broadcast [102], link-layer multicast [16]), b) implement diverse matching poli-
cies (e.g., location-based matches [18, 55], BitTorrent peer location), and c) preserve
user privacy in sensitive contexts (e.g., social matchmaking).
67
Our primary contribution is an evaluation of Twain by applying the abstrac-
tion to seemingly independent applications that span the networking stack and have
markedly different requirements and semantics for matches. We show how the Twain
template can be used to easily implement rendezvous for BitTorrent clients looking
for peers interested in sharing blocks of the same file. However, the Twain frame-
work immediately enables BitTorrent clients to independently construct, advertise,
and match on expressive criteria (e.g., peers from a specific AS, peers who support
specific transport layer enhancements, peers who offer a particular upload to down-
load ratio) without further protocol change. Using similar ideas, we show how a
more general privacy-preserving search application can be implemented in Twain.
We introduce two new applications that benefit from pseudonyous rendezvous:
mobile P2P and privacy-preserving matching for wide-area gaming. We show how
mobile users can find nearby users who match (essentially) arbitrary criteria regard-
less of whether the others are on the same provider network or within the same
broadcast domain. This application demonstrates that Twain can effectively cap-
ture spatio-temporal context, and it is indeed feasible to efficiently implement local
search using a wide-area service.
In our game matchmaking application, we describe how proposed systems for
matching gamers can leak user location, and describe how Twain can be used to
efficiently implement various latency-sensitive matchmaking algorithms. We show
how the basic framework is expressive enough to elegantly capture a range of local
policies, including policies that restrict revelation of location information only to
friends or only to those within a specified distance, and a policy that does not
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restrict revelation at all.
The chapter is organized as follows. We provide definitions and describe the
design of the Twain abstraction in Section 4.2. We describe a PlanetLab-based
implementation and the Twain API in Section 4.3. We enumerate example applica-
tions to which Twain can be applied in Section 4.4. We discuss attacks that can be
launched by a misbehaving rendezvous service and by malicious users in Section 4.5.
We conclude in Section 4.6.
4.2 Pseudonymous Rendezvous
4.2.1 Identities and Pseudonyms
An identifier is a globally unique bitstring that names specific data or prin-
cipal. An identity is a public identifier that represents a user2. Although we say
that identities are public, they may or may not be globally known. We say that
information is bound to data (such as an identifier) if that information is implicitly
revealed when the data is revealed as well. For instance, AS registry information is
bound to IP addresses. We say that an identifier is addressable if it is possible to
deliver a message to the owner of that identifier over some communication channel.
Users possess private information, that is, information whose disclosure they
wish to control. Some information is inherently private, for example the private key
corresponding to a user’s public key, and should never be transmitted over a public
2User, in this context, is a participant in a protocol. Users may be human, but could also
represent devices or other protocol entities.
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communication channel in plaintext. Other information is not inherently private,
but the binding between the information and the user’s identity is. For example,
a phone number by itself is not private information, but the binding of that phone
number to a person may be. In this case, transmission of the information over public
channels is safe as long as such a transmission does not also reveal the binding.
Pseudonyms are semantic-free opaque identifiers that are owned by a given
user. Pseudonyms must provide a proof of ownership, and, by default, should not
reveal information that identifies its owner. Therefore, it should be impossible to
map a pseudonym to a user, but users should not be able to communicate using
pseudonyms they do not own. One way to construct a pseudonym is for the user to
generate a public/private keypair. The public key is the pseudonym and the user
has the ability to generate signed messages from that pseudonym using the private
key; the user can therefore communicate authoritatively as any of her pseudonyms
without binding the communicated information to her identity. A user might explic-
itly bind a pseudonym to an identity, as we describe in Section 4.4, in which case all
information bound to the pseudonym is likewise bound to the identity. A user may
construct arbitarily many pseudonyms. This is encouraged: we expect users to use
independent pseudonyms for different applications so that binding one pseudonym
to the user’s identity does not affect the user’s other pseudonyms.
Pseudonyms, unlike other identifiers, are particularly useful for privacy pre-
cisely because, if handled correctly, they are not bound to other identifiers. Contrast
this with identifiers typically used for addressing at various layers such as MAC ad-
dresses, IP addresses, social network accounts, user-specific public/private keypairs,
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and cookie information. These identifiers can be bound to each other — and to
users themselves — in a variety of ways [64, 65]. Pseudonyms provide a layer of
indirection in which addressing is still possible while binding can be controlled by
the pseudonym owner.
4.2.2 Rendezvous Semantics
Twain is a formalization of a “process” similar to those employed by matchmak-
ing web sites, where users provide information which is used by the site to generate
potential matches. In Twain, users specify both their attributes and criteria func-
tions for generating a match. Twain provides the following properties.
Asymmetry. Rendezvous is asymmetric: one user makes herself available for
rendezvous, subsequently one other completes the rendezvous. Symmetry, if desired,
can be achieved if both users make themselves available for rendezvous.
Matchability. Users can rendezvous based on a variety of conditions, in-
cluding but not limited to: shared information, proximity, and interest based on
attributes or tags. A user who makes herself available for rendezvous binds at-
tributes to (only) her pseudonym, and publicly discloses the binding. The user who
completes the rendezvous issues queries over published user attributes to locate
matching users.
Constrainability. A user who makes herself available for rendezvous main-
tains control over who may rendezvous with her based on a set of criteria that must
be fulfilled by the user completing the rendezvous.
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Revelation. When rendezvous completes, at least one of the two users learns
the information necessary to continue communication on another channel, typically
by binding a pseudonym to an addressable identity. Revelation binds any revealed
attributes to both the pseudonym and the addressable identity.
The matchability property provides a lightweight means of filtering out unin-
teresting users, while the constrainability property provides a heavier, proof-based
assurance that the matched users are considered safe to communicate with under
the user’s policy. Matchability provides scalability, while constrainability provides
privacy or security.
We present the overall flow of a pseudonymous rendezvous — match, constrain,
and reveal — in Figure 4.1. In this process, one user, Alice, makes herself available
for rendezvous under the pseudonym A by contacting the rendezvous service. Then,
the other user, Bob, queries the rendezvous service under another pseudonym B, and
the rendezvous service returns the matches, including A. At this point, either Alice
and Bob engage in an interactive protocol through the rendezvous service so that Bob
can prove that he satisfies Alice’s constraints, or Alice non-interactively publishes
information through the rendezvous service that Bob will only be able to interpret
if he satisfies the constraints (through possession of out-of-band information, such
as a cryptographic key). Either case concludes with proof that Bob satisfies Alice’s

















Figure 4.1: Alice makes herself available for rendezvous under the pseudonym A,
and Bob discovers A through a query. (a) Alice reveals her identity specifically
to B after completing an interactive protocol that satisfies her constraints, or (b)
Bob learns Alice’s identity with local information S that implicitly satisfies Alice’s
constraints.
4.2.3 Generic Pseudonymous Rendezvous
We introduce the data structures and communication required for a generic
pseudonymous rendezvous. All applications that use Twain undertake this basic
procedure to generate matches. To illustrate each concept, we use a running exam-
ple of a customizable BitTorrent tracker. Using Twain to find peers in BitTorrent
provides end-users with capabilities that are not part of the base protocol. For in-
stance, the Twain tracker would allow users, for improved performance or for policy
reasons, to selectively find peers in specific ASes. The Twain tracker also allows
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users to match using non-network related criteria, e.g., a user may specify that she
will only peer with others who support specific transport layer features or possess a
certificate from a trusted CA or is willing to provide two data blocks in return for
each block she uploads. Each of these policies can easily be implemented in isola-
tion; Twain provides a framework for implementing any of them and allows users to
craft their own policies as necessary.
4.2.3.1 Definitions
Let RS be the rendezvous service. Let A, B be users. In our example, A makes
herself available for rendezvous and B seeks to rendezvous with a matching user (A
in this case). Let Â, B̂ be pseudonyms for A and B respectively. In this section,
we’ll assume that the RS executes correctly and returns only (and all) matches that
it finds. We discuss different forms of RS and user misbehavior in Section 4.5.
Let A have some properties PA and some criteria CÂ. The properties PA are a
set of bitstrings that represent the complete set of defining characteristics of A. In
our BitTorrent example, A may have the property that she belongs to a certain AS
and that she is willing to trade blocks of a specific file. The criteria is a predicate
that represents the requirements that B must satisfy to learn the binding between
A and Â. A may specify a criterion that whomever she peers with must upload two
blocks for every block that she provides.
Similarly let B have some properties PB and some query QB̂. This query is a
predicate that is satisfied by the properties of those users with whom B is interested
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in rendezvousing. The definitions of A and B implicitly provide the asymmetry
property we desire. In our example, B wants to peer with a user from a set of
whitelisted ASes for the same file, and will be willing to provide twice the upload
bandwidth to do so. A’s home AS is in the set of ASes that B wants to peer with.
4.2.3.2 Matchability
The Twain protocol proceeds as follows. Initially, A publishes a pair (mÂ, dÂ)
to the RS. The pair consists of a message mÂ to indicate availability for rendezvous,
and a data thunk dÂ that is used for continued processing if a match for the message
is found. B publishes only a message mB̂ that specifies a query to RS to request
matches. If B’s query matches A’s message, B can use the data thunk obtained via
the match to continue communication.
We’ll use g to denote a generic matching function that the RS uses to match
users. The inputs to g are A’s properties, as specified in the message mÂ, and B’s
query (in mB̂). These messages are formatted in a standard manner such that the
RS can match users without necessarily understanding the underlying sematics of
the data being matched. Note also that A may not necessarily want to publish
her properties in the clear, nor might B want to publish his query in the clear.
Instead, we assume that the properties and query are transformed using application
specific functions that obfuscate them as necessary, but still allow matching using
the function g. Obviously, the transformation functions are crafted such that such
that g(mÂ, mB̂) = 1 iff PA satisfies QB̂.
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The output of the transformation functions contains a key (k) that is application-
specific. Keys are unique for each match domain (e.g., for each application) and
allow for multiple matching conditions. Along with the key, each transformation
function also emits a value (v) for the match key, and identifies a specific data type
(t) and its associated comparator function. Thus, the output of the transformation
function is a set of triplets, denoted mA = {(ki, ti, vi,Â)} and mB = {(ki, ti, vi,B̂)}.
The messages published in this step provide the matchability property. For Bit-
Torrent, the keys could be “BitTorrent::FileNameHash” and “BitTorrent::Peer-AS”.
The data types are string for filename and positive integer for AS, with associated
comparator functions string matching and numeric comparison.
We support comparator functions that can match within a range. In general,
users may choose to specify upper and lower thresholds that can be used for a non-
exact match, or even empty thresholds that indicate that any value will match.
Thus, g outputs 1 iff the users agree on the keys being used in the match and the
key-wise comparison of every tuple lies within both users’ specified thresholds.
In our design, the matching function and the comparator functions are known
a priori to the RS. Applications transform their input to conform to comparator
functions from the set of supported comparators. The set of supported comparators
is described in detail in Section 4.2.3.4. The generic matching function g emits the
conjunction of all of the individual comparators.
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4.2.3.3 Constrainability and Revelation
Upon finding a match, the RS returns the matching message and data thunk
to the querying user. The data thunk contains sufficient information for the querier
to continue. In particular, it may contain a nonce which the querier may use as a key
to publish a message and it may contain an encryption key under which to publish
information in that message. The message will match a query that the original
publisher may issue (or have already placed in the system). Subsequent messages
should interactively publish attributes that, collectively, provide a proof that B
satisfies A’s constraints. Messages published in this step provide the constrainability
property. This interactive process eventually leads to final message in which one
party reveals an addressable identity. The final message provides the revelation
property.
In our BitTorrent example, the RS notifies B of a match, and using information
in A’s data thunk, B can publish a message with an attribute that asserts that he
is willing to upload at least two blocks for each block that A provides. In his data
thunk, B publishes a nonce and a public key. Once A submits a query using her
original nonce as the key, she will find all matching users, in particular B. A may
choose to publish an addressable identifier (IP address and port) encrypted with
B’s public key using the nonce published by B.
In our implementation, once the RS determines a match, it creates an ephemeral
session for publishing subsequent messages. Even though each message contains a
nonce as described, the RS does not have to match over the entire database; it sim-
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ply keeps track of sessions with active interaction until the rendezvous is complete
or the session times out. Note that the nonces allow the interactive protocol to
proceed completely asynchronously — sessions are maintained by the RS only to
improve runtime efficiency.
4.2.3.4 Data Types and Comparison Functions
To be truly application-agnostic, the RS needs to support general comparator
functions. However, in order to scale and be implemented as a network-wide service,
the comparisons must be computationally efficient.
We implement comparisons over primitive data types, such as integers, floating
point values, and strings. We also support comparisons over aggregates, in particular
sets and fixed dimensional coordinate spaces.
In the case of arbitrary-sized sets S1 and S2, the application can use for
c(S1, S2) the size of the sets obtained through set arithmetic, namely: |S1∩S2|, |S1∪
S2|, |S1 − S2|, |S2 − S1|, and|(S1 ∪ S2)− (S1 ∩ S2)|. Of these, set intersection is par-
ticularly useful for rendezvous since it captures the intuitive notion that two users
have something in common.
Enumerating all possible comparison functions on m-dimensional coordinates
is difficult. We identify two desirable classes of coordinate comparison functions,
aware that there may be useful other classes that we have not considered. The first
class is based on the p-norms, namely:
• ∀p ≥ 1, cp(x,y) =
∑m
i=0 |xi − yi|
p
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• c∞(x,y) = max({|xi − yi|}
m
i=0)
The second class is that of great-circle angular distance on the surface of
a sphere. This class is particularly useful for the m = 2 case as it provides a
way to compare geographical coordinates, a common requirement of location-based
rendezvous.
Using these pre-specified comparators is a specific design tradeoff that sacrifices
generality for scalability. An alternate design would be to have applications specify
an arbitrary matching function, specified in a safe language, that is executed over
the properties published by different users. However, we chose to constrain the
comparators to sequences of mathematical operations on primitive types as this
allows us to introduce the notion of “bounding boxes” that reduce the number of
potential matches that the RS has to consider for each user and that assist in
partitioning the data in the system. That is, any comparison function c should have
a corresponding bounding function b(c, v) = {l, u} where l and u represent bounds
on the values which could possibly match for the given comparison function and the
given value. As we demonstrate next, our choice of comparators provides sufficient
flexibility to implement a wide range of rendezvous.
4.3 Implementation
We describe an implementation of the Twain abstraction called TM-1 (Twain,
Mark I). TM-1 is a distributed, publicly available service that could for instance be
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run on PlanetLab or Amazon EC2. We first describe the TM-1 architecture and
then describe the Twain API exported by TM-1.
4.3.1 Architecture
TM-1 is a distributed system comprised of two types of nodes: controllers and
data. The data nodes are relational database backends that support our matchabil-
ity operations for a given partition of the overall rendezvous data. The controllers
manage the data partitions dynamically as requests are made, splitting and merg-
ing partitions as necessary as data nodes and controllers become overloaded with
requests. One of the controllers also serves as a “master” node. The service DNS
name should resolve to the master controller, since this node serves as the ingress
into the Twain system. Initial rendezvous requests are handled by the the master
node, which hands-off the request to a unloaded controller. Subsequent requests
in the same session bypass the master. The master node also serves to serialize
partitioning operations to maintain consistency in the system. If the master node
fails, any of the surviving nodes can take over as the new master. In large deploy-
ments, the DNS name could resolve to a load-balancing router, which could direct
initial requests to different controllers. We do not use a load-balancing router in our
implementation.
The goal of TM-1 is to demonstrate the feasibility of scaling Twain to the needs
of real systems. In our implementation, partitioning is done as needed based on the
value portion of a data tuple. When a data node becomes overloaded – i.e., it passes
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a certain threshold of disk usage – it informs a controller that it is overloaded and
picks the splitting value that will most significantly decrease its load. The controller
forwards this request to the master who splits the partition and assigns the new
partition to the least loaded data node. Queries are then directed to each data
node whose partition covers some portion of the query’s bounding box as described
in Section 4.2.3.4. TM-1’s load-based split and merge allows it to scale as match
volume increases since new data and controller nodes can be added dynamically as
needed.
We evaluate TM-1 on PlanetLab using 20 controllers and 20 data nodes, in-
creasing the number of available and querying clients across experiments from 10
to 110. The clients issue requests immediately after the previous request returns;
this is likely to be a much faster rate than we would expect from “real” clients who
may only issue one request every so often. The number of clients in our experi-
ments is not meant to directly correspond to some number of users of Twain, but
instead indicates the behavior of the system as more clients connect. We present
the results in Figure 4.2. The system is able to handle the additional requests as the
ratio of clients to servers increases, processing 44 requests per second when there
are 110 clients in the largest experiment we ran. Also, the system is able to op-
erate much more efficiently with bounding boxes than without, so it is important
for application developers to construct appropriate bounding boxes for applications
with custom comparison functions. TM-1 is more of a proof-of-concept than a true
test of Internet-scale scalability. We have used it to validate scaling to millions of


























Figure 4.2: Number of requests per second in Twain as the number of requesting
clients increases, with and without bounding boxes to assist in partitioning.
we did not (try to) saturate the PlanetLab nodes; instead, we wanted to obtain a
conservative measure of the resources required for processing a million queries a day.
We believe this deployment is sufficient demonstration that the Twain architecture
is scalable.
4.3.2 API
We present the Twain API in Table 4.1. Most operations are associated with
a given service, such as BitTorrent, to assist in data partitioning. Each PK pro-
vides a reference for a pseudonym; API calls that take two PK pseudonyms should
be thought of as belonging a session between those two pseudonyms, sessions that
are established when the query function returns non-empty sets of matches. The
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Remote functions invoked at a Twain control node
available(service, PK, {(k, t, v)}, expiry, σ, channel?)
→ success
query(service, PK, {(k, t, v)}, nonce, σ, limit, offset, store?,
expiry?, channel?) → {PKi, {(k, t, v)}i, expiry, σi}
interact(service, PK1, PK2, message, nonce, σ, channel?)
→ success
reveal(service, PK1, PK2?, message, nonce, σ)
→ success
pollQueries(PK) → {servicei, PKi}
pollResponse(service, PK1, PK2) → (type, message, nonce, σ)
Local functions and event handlers
createPseudonym() → (PK, SK)
recvQueries(PK) → channel
recvResponse(service, PK1, PK2) → channel
onQueries(channel) → {servicei, PKi}
onInteract(channel) → (message, nonce, σ)
onReveal(channel) → (message, nonce, σ)
Table 4.1: The Twain API.
store, expiry, and channel parameters of the query function can be used to pro-
vide matching symmetry: rather than have a user issue an available call followed
by a query call, these two operations are consolidated into the query call with
appropriate parameters.
Under this API, B’s query is never implicitly revealed to A: pollQueries and
recvQueries only return results if B initiates an interactive protocol. If A wishes
to know B’s query, the query can be explicitly revealed as part of the interactive
protocol. There is no guarantee that the query that B reveals is the same as the
query that B issued to RS, but A can at least verify that her properties satisfy the
claimed query.
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TM-1 supports both push and pull communication with the rendezvous ser-
vice. The recv functions establish a communication channel that listens for re-
sponses from the rendezvous service and triggers the appropriate event handler.
Alternatively, the application may choose not to establish an active channel (for
instance, if communication is expected to be infrequent and not time-sensitive, or if
the anonymity layer between the user and the rendezvous service precludes a persis-
tent response channel) and instead may use the poll functions to periodically check
for new matches, interactions, or revelations. A combination of these two modes is
also reasonable: the application may poll for queries, but once a query is discov-
ered it may want immediate updates for the interactive protocol and revelation to
complete the rendezvous as quickly as possible.
4.4 Application Design using Twain
Twain as a standalone service has utility only if it supports a range of applica-
tions. In this section, we use examples to demonstrate how application requirements
can be mapped on to Twain. We begin with a discussion of the general steps that
the application designer must undertake, and follow up with a discussion of five
specific application scenarios.
Our goal in this section is to demonstrate the versatility of Twain; we’ve chosen
to showcase the breadth of applications supported by Twain at the cost of a complete
analysis of any one.
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4.4.1 Process
The process of instantiating an application using Twain follows a sequence of
steps —idenfity, map, validate, and reveal— which we briefly discuss in the abstract
next.
Identify. The application designer has to identify attributes that she wants
to publish or query for, and make a decision about whether these properties and
queries should be bound to an addressable identifier. The RS is untrusted, thus
any sequence of messages that reveal sensitive attributes needs to be anonymized.
In these cases, we assume the user communicates with the Twain service using
an anonymity layer, such as Tor [21] or a mixnet [15], which serves to decouple
attributes from an addressable identity. The Twain API is designed to compose
with existing anonymity services.
Map. Once attributes and queries are identified, they need to be mapped to a
comparator supported by Twain. However, the problem here is more than molding
the application requirement to a supported comparator. The mere existence of a
non-obfuscated attribute (or conjunction of attributes) may leak information about
a user, regardless of whether the user communicates using an anonymity layer or
not. Even for obfuscated attributes, it may be possible for the RS or a user to
mount a dictionary attack using well-known match keys over small match domains.
(For instance, in our BitTorrent example, the a montoring agency will be able to
determine whether a particular file is being shared or not simply by iterating over
variations of names for the file using “BitTorrent::FileNameHash” key). We describe
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possible techniques for addressing the problem of leaked attributes in Section 4.5.
Validate. Once an initial match is found, constraints need to be satisfied using
the interactive protocol. The requirements and concerns in this step are similar to
the mapping step.
Reveal. Once users validate each other, one of the users must provide an
addressable indentifier. As described previously, the interactive communication se-
quence can be used to securely exchange cryptographic material such that only
validated users can map pseudonyms to addresses.
In the rest of this section, we demonstrate how specific applications can use
Twain. Our first two examples – mobile peer discovery and privacy preserving game
matchmaking – not only demonstrate the utility of the Twain abstraction but also
provide novel solutions to unsolved problems.
4.4.2 Mobile P2P: Customizable Local Rendezvous
As smart mobile devices become ubiquitous, mobile P2P systems such as
SMILE [55], BlueTorrent [38], and MobiClique [69] rely on the ability of these de-
vices to discover and communicate with other nearby devices for location-dependent
purposes. Discovering peers in mobile P2P systems should be much easier even than
locating peers in global Internet-based P2P systems because of the inherently nar-
rowed spatial scope coupled with the broadcast nature of wireless communication.
However, locating nearby mobile devices remains difficult. Devices may not
always support broadcast (3G) or be on the same broadcast domain (different WiFi
86
networks). Bluetooth broadcast has limited range, and is prohibited by certain
OS/hardware combinations. Even if a robust link layer broadcast were universally
available, it is not a panacea for rendezvous. For large user populations, broadcast
is inefficient, both at the link layer and because it requires devices to sift through
many false positives (imagine using broadcast to find friends at a sporting event).
Finally, broadcast solutions inherently leak information because it is possible for
third parties to monitor attributes (or queries).
Assuming interested parties can reach a RS, Twain provides a potentially
elegant solution to the problems we have outlined. The main technical question
revolves around whether it is possible to construct robust co-location cues entirely
passively. We’ve designed a mobile P2P application, LoKI, that answers in the
affirmative. We next describe how we used Twain in the LoKI design.
LoKI’s goal is to allow proximal users to periodically exchange shared secret
data for the purposes of post-hoc identity verification in a social PKI. This is sim-
ilar to Bond Breaker (Chapter 3), except in this case the shared knowledge will be
a combination of hard-to-guess bitstrings and the users’ knowledge of when social
meetings occurred. In order to periodically exchange secret bitstrings, matching
users must exchange MAC addresses, a task that we perform using Twain. We as-
sume that users exchange bluetooth addresses, but LoKI is not specific to bluetooth.
We designed and evaluated LoKI using commodity hardware, specifically Android
smartphones running supported (non-rooted) software.
Map. The relevant attributes for LoKI are the user’s location, specific at-
tributes she wishes to be searched on, and her bluetooth MAC address. The user
87
may also impose validation criteria before disclosing her address. We assume that
the user does not wish to share the mapping between her address and her attributes
publicly. That is, only other users who are actually nearby and can satisfy all other
constraints should be able to see that a given bluetooth MAC address is in that
vicinity. To simplify our presentation, we’ll describe the case where users wish to
locate any nearby user, i.e., the additional attributes and validation are null. These
can (and should) be added based on the application- and user-requirements as we
have described earlier.
Commodity devices (non-rooted smartphones) limit ambient observations re-
ported to applications. The standard Android API exports a list of visible MAC
addresses of WiFi access points and discoverable bluetooth devices and the RSSI for
each such signal. Is this information sufficient to find co-located users? In particular,
are there sufficient addresses to form a robust cue, and do proximal devices “see” the
same addresses? We’ve conducted a measurement study, described in Appendix A,
that suggests that the answer is a qualified “yes” (Figure 4.3). A relatively small
match threshold is likely necessary because of the variety of MAC addresses observed
even from devices less than a foot apart. However, as we expect most real-world,
socially relevant meetings to occur in stationary settings, we believe that rendezvous
based on these MAC addresses will generally succeed even with a threshold of, say,
k = 5 common MAC addresses.
Our current implementation constructs location tags using the information
exported by the Android API. This information is susceptible to being spoofed, since























Figure 4.3: Number of common bluetooth and wifi MAC addresses visible from two
proximal Android devices at any given time under typical daily movement (described
in Appendix A).
varying, signals, for instance by combining the high order bits in the timestamps
in each beacon message or with other information [66]. These are not available to
LoKI due to API limitations but can readily be incorporated when available.
IP addresses of mobile devices are ephemeral and harder to bind to an identity
than non-mobile devices. However, depending on the sensitivity of attributes that
are published, even a temporary binding may be undesirable. LoKI connects to the
RS through Tor, unless the user opts out of this feature.
Map. Let VA and VB be the set of visible wifi and bluetooth MAC addresses
from A and B’s respective devices. Let t be matching parameters that indicate the
use of set intersection on strings with a lower threshold of k and an unlimited upper
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threshold. Let T be the current application epoch, retrieved from the rendezvous
service. A and B publish:
mÂ = {(LoKI visible MACs, t, {H(M ||T )}M∈VA)} (4.1)
mB̂ = {(LoKI visible MACs, t, {H(M ||T )}M∈VB)} (4.2)
By hashing the visible MAC addresses with the current epoch, neither user
reveals the plaintext MAC addresses visible at the location at that time with this
published information. Without knowing the plaintext MAC addresses at a loca-
tion, an attacker cannot track location across epoch boundaries. A also publishes a
data thunk that provides the information necessary for the revelation step and an
indication that no interactive protocol is necessary.
Validate. In this example, the only constraint that A need put on revealing
her identity — in this case, her bluetooth MAC address — is that B knows the
threshold number of visible MAC addresses in the vicinity. No interactive protocol
is necessary since A does not constrain matches based on any attribute other than
location.
Reveal. We reveal A’s bluetooth MAC address BMA through Shamir’s Secret
Sharing [78]. In this case,
e = {Enc(S(BMA,M ||t, k),M ||t)} (4.3)
where Enc(m,K) is symmetric encryption of m with key K and S(m, p, k) computes
the secret share for message m, point p, and threshold k. Then, assuming B actually
knows sufficiently many visible MAC addresses for the current epoch, d consists of
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B decrypting the secret shares corresponding to the MACs he has observed and
combining them to recover BMA. At this point, rendezvous completes with B
learning the bluetooth MAC address of A, who both have observed similar ambient
MAC addresses and thus are likely to be proximal.
LoKI demonstrates how Twain can be used to implement a MAC-protocol
agnostic customizable rendezvous service. Even after a successful rendezvous, LoKI
cannot guarantee the establishment of a communication channel; the devices may be
barely out of bluetooth range of each other despite being able to observe the same wifi
access points. Our experiments show that Twain can be used to replace broadcast
for locating nearby users. Twain does not eliminate potential concerns regarding
privacy, but we believe LoKI demonstrates that these aspects are orthogonal to
rendezvous, even when an untrusted third-party is used to match users.
4.4.3 Game Matchmaking: Privacy-enabled Wide-Area Rendezvous
Users of multiplayer online games are often matched to each other in such a
way as to minimize latency, the most critical network measure for a smooth online
gameplay experience. Since all-to-all pings are impractical, systems such as Htrae [3]
rely on network coordinates [19] to estimate the latency between any two users
without testing the connections directly.
Although network coordinates are intended only to estimate latency, work in
IP geolocation such as CBG [30] demonstrates that coarse geographical informa-
tion can be ascertained given latency information from a collection of probes. Since
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Figure 4.4: Comparison of CBG error distances, defined as the difference between
the actual location and CBG estimate, when applied to both measured latencies
and network coordinate latency estimates for the East Coast node set.
embedding hosts into a metric space can introduce errors in latency, it is unclear
whether CBG can be applied to learn geolocation from network coordinates. We
conducted an experiment on PlanetLab to confirm our hypothesis that location can
indeed be inferred using latencies gleaned from network coordinates. We describe
our experiment and modifications to CBG in Appendix B. Our results, presented
in Figure 4.4, indicate that CBG using network coordinate latency estimations per-
forms just as well as when using measured latencies, with a median error distance of
279 km for network coordinate latencies and 301 km for directly measured latencies.
Therefore, network coordinates may be unintentionally and unexpectedly bound
to geographical location information. Twain can be used to enhance matchmaking
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by providing a measure of privacy for users concerned about leaking location infor-
mation. We’ve implemented a matchmaking application, Viveil, that uses Twain to
match gamers.
We assume that there exists a trusted authority for a given game, and that
this authority provides a certified network coordinate system [39] and certifies that
users are in fact valid players (e.g., paying subscribers, not cheaters, etc.). Certified
network coordinates are bound to the pseudonyms Â and B̂ upon creation.
The goal in Viveil is not to obscure inevitable direct latency measurements,
but to prevent attackers from inferring the geolocation of a user’s gamer id from
publicly available network coordinates. Said another way, we want to ensure that
an attacker must probe the user directly (either with latency measurements to her
hard-to-discover IP, or by requesting revelation of her network coordinate) in order
to learn the geolocation of the user’s gamer id, and that the user should have some
measure of control over who may probe her directly.
The actual level of privacy provided will be decided by user policy: some users
may not desire unlinkability of geographical location to gamer ids in favor of ease
of matchmaking, while others may want stronger guarantees. We identify three
policies that represent basic privacy requirements that users might choose: Public,
Valid-Users, and Friends-Only. In Public, the user is willing to share any of
her properties with anyone, and is only using the rendezvous service for discovery,
not privacy. In Valid-Users, the user is willing to reveal her IP address to any
valid user who can present a suitably close certified network coordinate, and is only
willing to reveal her gamer id to those users who can demonstrate a sufficiently fast
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connection for the purposes of gameplay. Finally, in Friends-Only, the user is only
willing to reveal her gamer id and IP address to friends: this provides much stricter
privacy guarantees, though in this case network coordinates are only necessary if
the user has many friends.
Identify. The salient properties for a user in Viveil are her network coordi-
nates, her gamer id (such as a Xbox Live gamertag or a Playstation Network ID),
the IP address of her gaming device, and a collection of observed latencies to both
a) landmarks or peers for the purposes of computing network coordinates, and b)
peers from gaming sessions. If the user’s IP address is known, an attacker could
use standard IP geolocation techniques to estimate the user’s geographical location.
Therefore Viveil users connect to the rendezvous service through Tor for any policy
other than Public.
Map. Let G be a string that represents the game the users want to play,
and let l be the maximum latency that that game supports. Let cÂ and cB̂ be
the network coordinates of A and B. Let t be the type of network coordinate along
with the coordinate comparison function3 and with no lower threshold and an upper
threshold of l milliseconds. Then A and B publish mÂ = {(Viveil:G, t, cÂ)} and
mB̂ = {(Viveil:G, t, cB̂)}, respectively.
Validate. No interactive protocol is necessary for the Public or the Friends-
Only policies, so A’s data thunk will reveal her IP address as described in the next
step.
3To our knowledge, our implementation supports comparisons of any type of network coordinate
proposed in the literature through the generic mathematical expression comparator.
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For the Valid-Users policy, A publishes a data thunk that instructs B to
publish his IP address (suitably encrypted), which he does. A first verifies that
the coordinate in mB̂ is a valid certified coordinate and that it lies within the
acceptable threshold l, then she likewise publishes her encrypted IP address. These
IP addresses are twice encrypted: first, with the public key associated with the
other user’s pseudonym for one-on-one communication, and second with a symmetric
key periodically distributed to all users considered to be valid users by the game
authority. At this point, A and B can connect directly over the Internet and measure
the latency between their gaming devices. A decides to reveal her identity (her
gamertag) after comparing this measurement to l. Note that this requires that both
A and B subscribe to the Valid-Users policy; if A does but B does not, he cannot
rendezvous with A since he is unwilling to reveal his IP address.
Reveal. Under the Public policy, e is simply the plaintext gamer id and IP
address information, and d is the identity function.
For the Valid-Users policy, A encrypts her IP with B̂’s public key, and B
simply decrypts with his private key.
For the Friends-Only policy, B’s friends distribute nonces periodically (say,
hourly). A publishes the nonce she received from B hashed with Â in plaintext and
B compares the published nonce to the list of received friend nonces.
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4.4.4 Privacy Preserving Search
Search describes many social networks applications. By aggregating informa-
tion through a service, users can find: classmates or peers (LinkedIn, Facebook),
buyers or sellers of a product (Craigslist, eBay), potential dates (Match.com, eHar-
mony), tagged content (Twitter, Facebook, Blogger), or nearby friends, strangers,
or content (Google+, Foursquare, Yelp).
Often this information is private in nature, so publishing it to an untrusted
service raises privacy concerns for users. Application-specific solutions exist [42, 54,
66, 80] to handle search in its various forms, and many of these solutions can be
straightforwardly applied using our rendezvous service as the aggregation point. For
certain user policies the indirection provided by pseudonyms can further enhance
the user’s privacy guarantees beyond the original solutions.
Policies. The relevant properties of users in a privacy preserving search ap-
plication vary based on what is being searched for, but generally can be expressed
as a collection of key-value mappings where the keys are strings and the values are
either strings or geographical locations. Some individual key-value pairs are inher-
ently private while others are only considered private if used in conjunction with
other key-value pairs.
For example, a user interested in selling a used car might have the following
properties: {product : ‘car’, make : ‘Honda’, model : ‘Civic’, year : ‘2009’, color :
‘orange’, price : ‘$18,000’, location : ‘City, State’, email : ‘user@host.domain’, phone :
‘800-555-1212’}. Individual values such as the user’s email address and phone number
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— values which are not unlike identities in their own right — may be considered to be
completely private, intended only to be revealed after a successful rendezvous (i.e.,
after the rendezvousing user satisfies the criteria set forth by the seller). Though
other individual values may not be private, the combination of them may be able
to uniquely identify a user4.
There exists a fundamental tradeoff between findability and privacy that can
only be reconciled by the user’s privacy policy, though this policy can be informed
by querying the state of the system. Before making the user available for ren-
dezvous, the application can test queries over the properties the user is publishing
to see if there are sufficiently many other users, providing a sort of empirical k-
anonymity [97], advising the user to, for instance, remove the car’s color if she does
not want it to be uniquely identifiable. Recent work [91] has tried to quantify pri-
vacy leakage as more information is revealed, and a search application could use
these techniques to better inform users.
Without a verifiable proof of possession, however, attackers can create fake
products to pollute attribute statistics. Sampling, dictionary, and pollution attacks
are inherent in any system that aggregates user information. Twain does not intro-
duce a new mechanism for either proving possession of attributes or for addressing
sampling attacks, but it does not enable new attack surfaces either.
Since we expect users to have an interest in at least some amount of privacy
4On Jan 27th, 2012, within 125 miles of the authors, there were over 5000 Honda Civics listed
for sale on the autotrader.com web site. Only two were orange. There were no orange Honda
Civics available within 100 miles.
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and it is not easy to predict the linkability of a user’s IP address and arbitrary
searchable information, we conservatively use Tor as a default anonymity layer for
this application.
Map. For the purposes of deciding how to transform her properties prior to
publishing, we first must know: is the user making herself searchable to friends or
to strangers? For simplicity, we consider a friend to be anyone with whom the user
shares a piece of secret information, such as a symmetric key, while strangers lack
this information.
To be searchable by strangers, the user must advertise plaintext versions of
her properties according to her policy decisions. If the user is concerned that some
combination of her properties will identify her too narrowly, she splits the prop-
erties into subsets across multiple pseudonyms Â1, Â2, ..., Ân and publishes these
properties as mÂ1 , mÂ2 , ..., mÂn .
There are two alternative options for being searchable by friends based on
obfuscated versions of her properties. These options differ in type of overhead they
introduce, making them appropriate for different classes of applications. In both
cases, we assume that the user periodically distributes a temporary symmetric key
SKA to all of her friends. This scheme applies equally well to attribute-based groups
as used in Persona [6].
In the Publish-Per-Friend case, A creates a pseudonym Âfi per friend and
publishes values under those respective pseudonyms that contain Enc(PA, SKfi),
i.e., she encrypts her data independently for each friend. Then B can simply match
once with the value Enc(QB, SKB) to find all of his friends’ content that matches
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the given query. This option is more suited to applications where there are fewer
publishes than queries, such as user profiles or product sales.
In the Query-Per-Friend case, A creates a single pseudonym Â and publishes
values that contain Enc(PA, SKA). B on the other hand, issues queries under
pseudonyms B̂fi containing the value Enc(QB, SKfi). This option is more suited to
applications where there is much more content published than there will be queries,
such as searching through all of the status updates on a friend feed.
Validate. Users of privacy-preserving search have many options for interac-
tive protocols that can be used to constrain who may learn their identity, depending
on the nature of the data being searched:
• Shared knowledge questions, as in Bond Breaker (Chapter 3).
• CAPTCHAs [89] to thwart automated identity harvesting.
• Biometric tests. For instance, A could request that B include an audio clip of
a certain phrase, if A would recognize B’s voice.
• Reputation-based certifications through a trusted third-party service, for in-
stance to ensure a highly-rated buyer on eBay without necessarily revealing
identity.
• Currency exchange, perhaps with BitCoins [61].
• Information from other distributed credit or reputation systems, such as Credo [87].
Reveal. Upon successful completion of the protocol in the previous step, A
reveals her identity encrypted with B̂’s public key.
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4.4.5 NAT Traversal using Twain
A well-known problem stems from the use of Network Address Translation
boxes (NATs) designed to address the limited number of available IP addresses
on the public Internet. A device behind a NAT can easily communicate to other
devices with public IP addresses, but not to other devices behind NATs. A simple
solution to this is STUN [74], in which one of the devices contacts a STUN server
to learn the public-facing IP address and port allocated by the NAT, advertising
that addressing information to the other user. This assumes that the users have
some way of addressing each other at a higher layer. Twain naturally provides both
higher-layer addressing in the form of rendezvous matches, and can easily provide
the public-facing IP address and port to any host that contacts it, even if that
addressing information corresponds to the egress of an anonymity layer.
4.4.6 BitTorrent and other P2P Applications
We have already described an enhanced BitTorrent tracker built using the
pseudonymous rendezvous abstraction in Section 4.2.3. The same model can be
applied for other decentralized peer-to-peer applications as well. Clients for decen-
tralized multi-user applications, e.g., DHTs [73], media streaming [90], backup [49],
can use the same schematic to replace ad-join protocols. As a bonus, using Twain
will allow users to specify customizable join criteria, and also maintain privacy if
users choose to join using a anonymizing layer.
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4.5 Discussion
Users access a rendezvous service (RS), which is an untrusted process accessed
over the Internet at an publicly known address. Minimally, users expect the RS to
store attributes and queries, and produce matches within a reasonable time period.
We assume that the RS can reveal messages it receives to other parties (effec-
tively rendering it a public communication channel). The rendezvous service could
also return false rendezvous matches or false messages from a pseudonym it does not
own, but this type of misbehavior can be detected by the user. The RS may sup-
press matches; without external protocol mechanisms, such as randomized checks
or witness sets [33], match supression cannot be detected by users.
4.5.1 Matching over Sensitive Data
Users need not entrust the rendezvous service with private data. However,
some applications, e.g., a service matching potential dates, may entail the rendezvous
service matching pseudonyms using attributes that contain sensitive information.
Even though a match reveals only a pseudonym, existing work has demonstrated
that relatively small amounts of correlated information [84, 64, 37] is sufficient to
identify individuals.
Twain does not provide a generic solution to deanonymization, and the ren-
dezvous service can mount known attacks to try to unmask pseudonyms. The re-
stricted case in which users wish to rendezvous with others with whom they’ve
previously shared a secret key has been addressed using identity-based cryptogra-
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phy [63]. In this setting, the rendezvous service does not learn any information
about the attributes over which users are matched. The general case is open: a
possible approach is for users to intentionally create “Sybils” – a set of plausible
user profiles along with their own and submit each profile with a different pseu-
donym. The Sybil profiles should be created using expected distributions in each
profile category such that the rendezvous service (or any other users) are unable
to distinguish Sybils from “real” users. This scheme assumes that the entire match
database is public, enabling users to able to pick attributes using profile value dis-
tributions. A similar approach for obfuscating real user information using Sybils
generated via the expected distribution of attributes is described in NOYB [31].
Note that if the database is not public (or when the system is being initiated), users
may choose Sybil attributes that follow the distribution of public profiles in existing
social networks, as described in NYOB.
Sybil profiles would (ideally) ensure that the rendezvous service cannot as-
certain whether they are matching a “real” user or a Sybil. In the worst case, as
long as real users choose attributes carefully (by following a known distribution),
they can plausibly deny being the owner of a pseudonym that matches their known
attributes. Further, the availability of the expected attribute data provides the user
(or application) with sufficient information to obtain a measure of the amount of
identifying information that is leaked by information associated with a pseudonym.
We note that the creation of Sybil profiles that mixes user data within noise for
placement in a untrusted database is a dual of well-known ideas in differential pri-
vacy [22], whereby a trusted database perturbs query results with noise such that
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untrusted users cannot ascertain details of individual datum.
4.5.2 User attacks: Denial-of-Service
In addition to attacks by the RS, it is worth noting at this point that users
are generally untrusted as well. The rendezvous service cannot distinguish users;
it deals purely in pseudonyms and so a user may issue arbitrarily many queries
under different pseudonyms. Malicious users can therefore launch various attacks.
User initiated attacks fall into two broad categories: users may attack the system by
launching a DoS attack consisting of spurious match requests. Alternately, malicious
(or curious) users may try to deanonymize pseudonyms by launching “dictionary”
attacks that scan through different attributes.
Even though users are anonymous, the rendezvous service can address DoS
attacks by using well-known techniques such as CAPTCHAs [89] or automated
proof-of-work techniques described in Portcullis [67]. Dictionary attacks by users
(in the worst case where users are not rate-limited or if the RS colludes with users)
are equivalent to deanonymization attacks launched by the rendezvous service, and
are addressed in the same way.
4.6 Conclusion
We have described the Twain abstraction, a primitive that allows two users who
wish to communicate but who do not know how to address each other to find each
other based on potentially private information. We provided diverse examples of how
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the abstraction could be used to solve problems in networked systems, demonstrating
the utility of the abstraction as a modular component in system design. We have
shown how Twain can implement well-known rendezvous mechanisms, and how re-
casting old problems (such as BitTorrent peer-selection) within Twain enables more
expressive solutions. We have described two new problems —mobile P2P rendezvous
and privacy-preserving matchmaking for games— for which Twain provides clean
solutions. Finally, we have described an implementation of Twain and demonstrated






Several works examine the characteristics and recent growth of OSNs [27, 43,
45, 59, 60]. Krishnamurthy and Willis [47] study how OSNs share users’ personal
data with third parties such as applications and advertisers. They note that Face-
book places no restrictions on the data that is shared with external applications.
Advertisers use personal data, as well as information acquired through cookies, to
serve targeted ads.
Prior research has characterized privacy problems with OSNs. Acquisti and
Gross [1, 29] show that Facebook users at CMU often share more data than they are
aware of. Lam et al. [48] study a Taiwanese OSN to show that users’ annotations
compromise the privacy of others. Ahern et al. [4] study Flickr to see how location
information is leaked through users’ photographs. Several studies [34, 44, 93] exploit
the friend graph to infer characteristics about users. Persona resolves these issues
by allowing users to precisely express the policies under which their data, including
friend information, is encrypted and stored.
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5.1.2 Privacy-enabled OSNs
The research community has recognized the problem of privacy in OSNs and
proposed several solutions which build on top of existing OSNs. NOYB [31] hides
an OSN user’s personal data by swapping it with data “atoms” of other OSN users.
NOYB provides a way to map these atoms to their original contents. flyByNight [52]
is a Facebook application that facilitates secure one-to-one and one-to-many mes-
sages between users. Finally, Lockr [86] uses ACLs based on social attestations of
the relationship between two users, similar to how Persona distributes ASK s to users
that satisfy certain attributes. Persona and Lockr both use XML-based formats to
transfer privacy-protecting structures.
5.1.3 Access control and ABE
In Persona, the attributes a user has determines what data they can access.
This resembles role-based access control [26] and attribute-based access control,
which bases authorization decisions on the attributes assigned to users [12, 96].
Attribute based encryption (ABE) was introduced as an application of a type of
identity based encryption (IBE) called fuzzy IBE [75]. Unlike early ABE schemes,
CP-ABE [9], which Persona uses, binds ciphertexts to access structures while secret
keys contain attributes. Ciphertexts can be decrypted with a key that contains a
set of attributes that satisfies the access structure. Multi-authority ABE [14, 51]
removes the need for transitive key translations but requires each user to have a
globally-unique identifier and the attribute set to be partitioned amongst the users.
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Pirretti et al. [70] show how to build a dating social network that only reveals
information about a user if their attributes match another user’s desired descrip-
tion. Unlike Twain or Persona, their system relies on a single authority to generate
all secret keys. Traynor et al. [88] introduce a tiered architecture to improve the
performance of ABE so that it scales to millions of users.
5.1.4 OSN Impersonation
Toomim et al. [85] show that shared knowledge could be used as an alternative
to group-based access control in OSNs. In their work, users protect OSN content
by guarding it with a question; only users who can answer the question can access
the content. In contrast, Bond Breaker uses exclusive shared knowledge to verify
identity rather than group membership, and exchange cryptographic keys on which
access control can be built.
Studies of OSN security show that current methods of identifying users are
insufficient. Bilge et al. [11] describe an attack in which the attacker copies a victim’s
information from one OSN to another to impersonate the victim on the new OSN.
This allows the attacker to befriend the victim’s friends, learn information about
them, and continue the attack on those new users. Key exchange with shared
knowledge could be used to prevent such attacks; the attacker may have access to
personal information, but not exclusive shared knowledge. Felt [25] also describes
an exploit for hijacking Facebook accounts (which has since been patched). Our
work could be used to detect hijackings and repair them.
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Alexander et al. [5] describe a modification to off-the-record (OTR) instant
messaging that allows users to authenticate each other using shared secrets. Sted-
man et al. [82] study how a small group of users interact with the modification.
Our work instead considers shared knowledge in the broader arena of OSNs and
quantitatively demonstrates the ability of users to employ shared knowledge.
5.2 Rendezvous
5.2.1 Local Area Rendezvous
Multicast DNS (mDNS) [16] allows networked devices to locate services in the
local area using a link-local top-level domain (“.local”) . mDNS uses link-layer multi-
cast to advertise and query for resources. Resource information is stored using DNS
records of type SRV (service) or special TXT records known as DNS-SD (service
discovery), also known as “Rendezvous” records. Unlike Twain, mDNS requires par-
ticipants to be on the same broadcast domain (link), and requires users to explicitly
advertise services on the local network.
Bluetooth [102] devices broadcast query messages in order to find nearby de-
vices, with those in discoverable mode responding to the query, supplying device
properties and information on its addressable identity (MAC address). Through
the process of pairing, which completes the rendezvous between two devices, both
devices generate a link key in order to create an encrypted channel for further com-
munication.
By design, Bluetooth is only useful for pairing users within range (few tens
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of meters), and both Bluetooth and mDNS rely on a broadcast channel. Unlike
these protocols, Twain allows users on a local network (or nearby users regardless of
network) to rendezvous without divulging interests or queries on the local network.
We further discuss the merits of non-broadcast rendezvous in Section 4.4.2.
5.2.2 Location-Based Rendezvous
SMILE [55] is a protocol for anonymous communication between users who
have encountered each other at some time in the past. SmokeScreen [18] provides
similar functionality, including "presence-sharing" among users. In both systems,
devices exchange cryptographic information in the background, which can subse-
quently be used to initiate a conversation. Both systems use a server (untrusted
in SMILE, trusted in Smokescreen) for rendezvous. These protocols are prominent
examples of how the pseudonymous rendezvous abstraction is being replicated ad
hoc on a per-application basis.
Detecting proximity based on observable, location-based signals is a well-
studied problem with a number of solutions for other settings. Narayanan et al. [66]
describe the use of location tags to allow for private proximity testing of two de-
vices, for instance if two devices with known identities want to verify proximity even
though they do not intend to communicate. By relying on wifi broadcast packets
for location tags, general non-rooted devices will not be able to participate in their
system. They also assume the existence of known identities — the very problem we
are trying to solve.
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Varshavsky et al. [57] and Mathur et al. [58] similarly describe mechanisms for
confirming device identity based on observable radio signals to prevent man-in-the-
middle attacks on Diffie-Helman key exchange. Their goal is slightly different than
ours: they wish to ensure that two specific devices pair securely based on proximity,
while we wish to construct temporary pseudo-anonymous identities for all proximal
devices that can be matched to permanent identities later.
Applications such as KeySlinger [111] and Bump [103] use real world meetings
to exchange information, including public keys. These exchanges are user-initiated
at the time of the meeting, but we provide flexibility for users to initiate key-
exchange long after a meeting has occurred, which we believe more closely resembles
typical establishment of OSN relationships.
5.2.3 Pseudonymous Communication
In his Ph.D. thesis, Goldberg [28] describes PIP, a pseudonymous communi-
cation infrastructure for the Internet. Many of the ideas he presents have influ-
enced our work, though there are key differences between PIP and Twain. Most
notably, PIP allows for pseudonymous rendezvous but it requires that one end of
the rendezvous have a well-known identifier, restricting PIP to only client-server
rendezvous. I3 (Internet Indirection Infrastructure) [83] allows for pseudonymous
rendezvous-based communication, where the pseudonyms of the users exist as trig-
ger id’s in the system. In order to send packets, senders are only required to know
the corresponding id for the receiver, without needing to use the actual address-
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able identity (IP address) of the receiver. By matching on more complex criteria,
Twain supports peer-to-peer rendezvous, enabling more applications including the
ones described in Section 4.4.1.
Unlike PIP and I3, Twain is intended only as a communication bootstrapping
mechanism: once two users rendezvous, they are expected to continue their com-
munication elsewhere. If this intention can be enforced, e.g., using the techniques
outlined in Section 4.5, it will limit both the resources that Twain must provide and
the ability of malicious users to abuse the service for illicit distribution. This prop-
erty of Twain also enables it to be a globally available persistent service as opposed
to the ad hoc, temporary services described by Goldberg.
Finally, there is a fundamental difference in how pseudonyms are meant to be
used in Twain, compared with that of PIP and I3. In Twain, the pseudonyms are
a means to an end; once rendezvous has completed, we expect that at least one of
the two parties involved will bind her pseudonym to a real identifier. Twain, unlike
PIP and I3, is not specifically intended for long-term pseudonymous communication.
Despite this intention, Twain does support pseudonymous communication; the user
need only bind her temporary Twain pseudonym with some other addressable pseu-
donym at the end of rendezvous.
5.2.4 Wide-area Resource Location
RFC 1546 [68] (Host Anycasting Service) is perhaps the earliest wide-area
attribute-based routing protocol defined for IP. Hosts share the same anycast IP
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address, and packets may be directed to any host that shares the address. Thus, it
is possible to rendezvous using anycasting using only the anycast address, instead
of the unique IP address of the destination host. Global IP-Anycast [40] describes a
scheme for scalable routing of anycast addresses. The idea of rendezvous is the same,
with anycast hosts being reachable without needing to know their unique IP address.
Anycasting is routinely used to provide fault-tolerance and improve performance for
wide-area distributed services, prominently the root name servers [76]. Being an
entirely network layer abstraction, anycasting is limited in the flexibility it permits
in terms of “attributes” that a host can advertise, and how queries are matched to
hosts.
Anycasting can be implemented at higher layers as well: Application-Layer
Anycast [10] is an extension to DNS that uses a top-level domain “.any” to allow
clients to specify metrics which are used to select one from a set of eligible servers.
Application-layer anycasting is more flexible than network-layer implementations,
but in that it is designed to resolve hostnames. Intentional Naming Service (INS [2])
uses attribute/value names for message routing. Along with regular name resolution,
INS supports late-binding anycast and multicast. INS supports message forward-
ing based on application-specific metrics for early-binding and anycast. Like these
systems, Twain can be used to resolve hostnames, but allows for more flexible match-
ing criteria, including approximate matches and interactive proofs, which would be
likely be cumbersome to encode in a hostname.
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5.2.5 Publish-Subscribe Protocols
Publish-subscribe protocols [8, 13, 24, 83] enable asynchronous communication
and rendezvous by design. Twain is akin to a publish-subscribe system to which pri-
vacy conscious users connect using an anonymous communication system. However,
Twain provides a structure for communication that is tailored for locating resources
by attribute, and not for continual receiving continual messages on subscribed chan-
nels. Unlike most pub-sub systems, Twain allows not only the querying user, but
also the the advertising user to constrain matches. Users may specify policies, in
the form of an interactive protocol, that are used to validate that both advertiser





Many challenges remain in building systems that allow users to manipulate
private data through the types of applications to which they have become accus-
tomed. Though I have provided technical solutions to many of these problems, I
anticipate that future research will yield novel solutions to the problems I have yet
to solve.
Although I have described two very broad classes of applications – content-
agnostic applications and applications that operate on semi-private data – there
are applications that do not fit into either of these categories. That is, there are
applications that require an unobfuscated mapping between user identities and data
contents. Future work in this area would be to first, carve out any more classes of
applications that can provide privacy without trusting a third party; second, prove
that any remaining applications cannot provide privacy without trusting a third
party; and last, for a given application thought to lie in this class of remaining
applications, search for alternative means to provide the application service that
would allow the application to be included in one of the other classes.
One example for another class of applications that might include applications
not already found in the two classes I identify in this work is the set of applications
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that can provide privacy through secure multi-party communication techniques [94],
i.e., when two or more known parties want to agree to the output of some function
of their private attributes. Developing a rigorous taxonomy of privacy-enabled ap-
plications – along with the intersections between application classes – is a natural
extension of the work I have started.
Much of my work includes proof-of-concept implementations that demonstrate
that a given design is practical, but they do not consider the many optimizations
that could be applied to my designs or what the privacy implications might be for
those optimizations. A more rigorous evaluation of my designs would be a significant
contribution, but has so far been hampered by a lack of extensive, realistic bench-
marks on which to test them. One future venture that I would strongly support is
that of a social network simulator, to provide the power and convenience of network
simulators to the social network setting for system designers. I envision that a social
network simulator would provide empirically-derived, configurable settings to sim-
ulate both the friend graph and application workloads for core OSN services such
as the activity feed, wall, profiles, and photos. The system designer would define
simulation parameters to choose the size of the network, how densely connected its
users are, and a distribution for the endpoints and sizes of data transmissions across
the social network; ideally user-to-user connections and data distributions could be
derived empirically from real networks. A social network simulator would facilitate
evaluation of many ideas including differential privacy, scalable OSN data storage
architectures, and social data caching.
Though I provide high-level descriptions of the privacy concerns associated
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with certain applications and sketch solutions to provide certain privacy policies,
individual attention should be applied to these problems to construct complete
and rigorous privacy solutions. This is especially true for those problems that I
have newly identified, namely, mobile peer-to-peer background communication and
privacy-enabled game matchmaking.
Revocation of access to data remains a challenging problem; once data has
been published, it is nearly impossible to verifiably destroy it, and moving forward
with correct privacy requires expensive, difficult, and complicated key distribution
mechanisms. Technical mechanisms that assist a user in recovering from a privacy
error are unfortunately lacking and would be a beneficial addition to the advocacy
of user-oriented privacy design.
6.2 Deployment Hurdles
One of the hardest questions that remains is how to migrate users from ex-
isting social networks to a newly designed one. The technical solutions that I have
described provide certain objective advantages over state-of-the-art practices in cur-
rent OSNs, yet current OSNs possess a sort of “gravity” that discourages competition
from new OSNs. That is, the more users an OSN has, the more utility that OSN can
offer to a typical user. Persona, if fully developed with many Twain-based applica-
tions, would still have difficulty getting off the ground without a substantial initial
influx of highly-connected users. Though this is not a technical problem, there may
be more technical contributions to be made to facilitate the network effect [41] on
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a new OSN.
Another question is whether users actually want to be in control of their private
data, and if so, how much are they willing to pay for it? Certainly there are some
users who do care, but if the majority of users do not care about privacy, will it even
be possible to entice enough users to use an OSN in which the only advantage is
that of greater privacy control? Here I am somewhat discouraged: history suggests
that ease-of-use is far more important than privacy as users have transitioned to
cloud-based storage [104], and membership of pay-to-use services is generally less
than that of comparable advertising-based free services [107]. If I realistically expect
for most users to migrate to a new OSN, it must be at least as easy to use as any
OSNs they currently use and it must be free to use. It remains an open, cross-
disciplinary problem to create an OSN that simultaneously: supports user-defined
privacy through cryptography, is no more difficult to use than existing OSNs, and
can pay for its costs without targetted advertising based on access to private user
data.
6.3 The “Best” Solutions
A last question that I consider is whether the solutions I have provided to the
problems I have identified in my work are really the best solutions to the problems.
In Persona, by design I mandate decentralization to give users some control over
their social network account and identity through competition. The decentralized
requirement motivates much of my design of Persona. I also choose to use ABE to
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facilitate secure OSN communication; though it is likely that secure OSN communi-
cation could be provided using an alternate scheme that involves only symmetric and
asymmetric cryptography, the simplicity of the ABE abstraction fits the situation
of Persona extraordinarily well and provides both users and application designers
with intuition about privacy in the system.
As far as I can tell, there is no reason to not include Bond Breaker as a
component of OSN PKI bootstrapping. Though my study shows that some users
have difficulty using Bond Breaker for PKI bootstrapping, it provides an extra option
for key exchange that, as my results show, remains difficult to attack. Including
Bond Breaker as a component of PKI bootstrapping does not preclude the use of
other, potentially better solutions, and merely gives the user another intuitive way
to verify identity.
Pseudonymous rendezvous, or at least something that resembles it, appears
to be the only solution to providing privacy for many applications. This statement
is supported by the fact that many existing systems implement a pseudonymous
rendezvous component in an ad hoc way. The real question is whether extracting
pseudonymous rendezvous as a modular component has utility or whether these ad
hoc solutions are sufficient. My argument that the Twain abstraction is useful is an
anecdotal one, the result of consecutive attempts to solve different privacy problems.
In each case I returned to the same problem of pseudonymous rendezvous, confident
that that was the best solution I could provide. It is my opinion that when the
opportunity for reuse presents itself so often and so strongly that abstraction and
generalization are clearly the path to pursue to reduce the amount of work that
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needs to be done in the future.
6.4 Conclusion
In this work, I have demonstrated technical solutions to many problems that
involve manipulating private data on public networks. My solutions are practical
and solve a wide range of privacy problems on the Internet today. Collectively my
solutions combine to form a social network in which users, not providers, control
the exposure of their own private data.
I demonstrated with Persona that private data can be protected even when
stored with untrusted third parties, and that many OSN applications only require
references to data rather than data contents. I solved the problem of key man-
agement, even in difficult settings such as with friends-of-friends, where a group’s
membership may be unknown.
With Bond Breaker I showed that, even though it is easy for attackers to
impersonate users on an OSN to subvert their friends’ privacy policies, I can use user-
driven shared knowledge to detect and eliminate these attacks. I also demonstrated
that I could bootstrap a robust social PKI by propagating public key attestations
through a web-of-trust.
Finally, through Twain I was able to broadly expand upon the set of appli-
cations to which I can provide users with (hopefully sufficient) privacy policies. I
showed that the Twain pseudonymous rendezvous abstraction is a useful way to
think about both privacy and connectivity through a variety of examples, some old
119
and some new. Together with Persona, Twain presents the case that it is generally





Our trace collection used two Motorola Droids less than a foot apart from each
other in a backpack pocket. The Droids periodically scanned every thirty seconds for
wifi access points, discoverable bluetooth devices, and GPS coordinates. The scans
were not synchronized; we merely matched up measurements based on the nearest
time as an approximation. The traces consisted of two trips walking through the
University of Maryland campus, two trips from College Park, MD to Bethesda, MD
by way of the Washington, DC metro rail system, and two trips from College Park,




In order to verify that geolocation information can be derived from network
coordinates, we deployed Pyxida on two sets of Planetlab nodes: a low-density set
consisting of 30 nodes located throughout the US, and a high-density set consisting
of 27 nodes located primarily near the East Coast of the US. We computed two-
dimensional network coordinates with a height component, and queried the nodes
after convergence. In addition, we measured actual node-to-node latencies to pro-
vide a grounds for comparison to the results of CBG based on network coordinate
estimated latencies.
Applying the base CBG algorithm to the latency estimations derived from
network coordinates was not effective. Due to the inaccuracies of embedding nodes
into a coordinate space, the network coordinate latency estimations would underes-
timate or overestimate the actual measured latency between the two nodes, possibly
beyond what should be physically possible. This affects CBG during the landmark
RTT vs. distance bestline calculation, where landmark (RTT, distance) pairs would
exist below the “baseline”, defined as the speed of information along fiber optic cable
(1 ms RTT per 100 km). In addition, there were a number of cases where one or
more distance contraints were incorrectly derived due to the inaccuracy of the esti-
mated latencies. In the base CBG algorithm, this would return that the geolocation
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of a given node could not determined.
To better apply CBG to network coordinates, several modifications were im-
plemented on top of the CBG algorithm as described by Gueye et al. [30]. Any
estimated (RTT, Distance) point that lies below the baseline is dismissed as it is a
result of underestimation of the latency and cannot physically occur. In addition,
outliers in the set of distance constraints are removed based on the area formed as a
result of the intersection of the largest number of distance constraints. These mod-
ifications relax the CBG algorithm so that it can be applied to network coordinates
which may not follow the baseline assumption of CBG.
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